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Israel

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I. Introduction

1. As it embarks on its third cycle of the UPR[1], Israel, as a democratic country governed by the rule of law, remains committed to protecting and ensuring human rights.

II. Methodology and consultation process

2. This Report of the State of Israel was prepared in accordance with guidelines detailed in Resolution 16/21[2] and its Annex, Decision 17/199[3] of the Human Rights Council and the "3rd Cycle Universal Periodic Review National Report Guidance Note".

3. This Report was compiled by the MFA[4] in collaboration with the MOJ[5] and all relevant Government Ministries. As discussed in previous reports, Israel maintains a vibrant dialogue with civil society organizations, in particular within the UN Human Rights treaty bodies and UPR reporting process. Since 2012, the MFA and MOJ have promoted a project under the auspices of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, designed to facilitate open dialogue and improve cooperation between State authorities and civil society organizations, specifically concerning the reporting process to UN Human Rights Committees. The project created a joint forum, attended by state authorities, scholars and representatives of civil society, to discuss State reports that are submitted to these committees on an ongoing basis and encourage civil society organizations to comment on the State's draft reports.

4. Since the last reporting cycle, Israel also introduced, in 2017, a series of "Round Tables". This project entailed six discussion sessions in academic institutions located throughout Israel so as to facilitate diverse participation. The sessions offered a unique platform for free discourse between civil society, academics and government representatives on core human rights issues related *inter alia* to: LGBT Rights; Israelis of Ethiopian descent; the local Bedouin population; women's rights; rights of persons with disabilities; and social and economic rights in the periphery. One of the aims of this project was to allow grass roots organizations, which usually do not have the resources to submit shadow reports to the general treaty bodies and UPR process, to participate in the UN HR reporting mechanism.

III. Human rights infrastructure

A. International human rights framework

1. International instruments

5. Israel updated its Common Core Document and reported on the following treaties during the period between 2013 and 2017: the ICCPR[6], the CERD[7], the CAT[8], the CRC-OP-SC[9], the CEDAW[10], and CRPD[11].

6. Israel is pleased to report that in March 2016, the GOI[12] ratified the WIPO's[13] Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, which establishes an exception to intellectual property laws to enable the creation of a copy of a published work, in a format suitable for use and enjoyment by persons who are visually impaired without requiring the consent of the right-holder.

7. Israel's accession to this treaty underlines the importance that Israel attributes to the rights of PWD[14] and the efforts it invests in promoting their rights. In fact, Israel's Making Works, Performances and Broadcasts Accessible for Persons with Disabilities Law

(Legislation Amendments) 5774-2014,[15] prescribes arrangements that go beyond the Marrakesh Treaty in several ways. For example, while the Treaty mandates the creation of accessible formats for visually impaired persons only, the Law allows for the creation of accessible formats for all PWD.

2. Engagement and dialogue

8. Israel maintains close relations with a variety of international and domestic human rights bodies, compiles detailed state reports and conducts dialogues with high-ranking foreign delegations as an expression of its appreciation for transparency and despite the HRC's unfair treatment of Israel, including the overtly discriminatory Item 7 in its agenda, which singles-out Israel, while all other countries' human rights situations are dealt with under appropriate, non-state specific items. Among others, Israel continuously engages with the representatives of OCHA[16], OHCHR[17], and UNICEF[18] and fully cooperates with the UNSG[19] Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.

9. Since 2013, Israel has hosted several senior officials for this type of engagement, including, *inter alia*, two visits by former UNSG Ban Ki-Moon[20] and recent visits by UNSG Antonio Guterres[21] and by the UNHRC[22] Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women[23]. Israel has extended an invitation to the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Eritrea to visit in 2017-18. In addition, Israel hosted Mr. Peter Maurer, the President of the ICRC[24] twice, and maintains close cooperation with the ICRC.

3. Cooperation with United Nations agencies and bodies[25]

10. Israel has a long record of facilitating the work of UN agencies and cooperating with UN bodies, providing reports and engaging in dialogue with the relevant committees. Israel regularly cooperates and facilitates visits by these bodies unless the mandate involved is inherently political or particularly biased.

11. Israel has appeared before the following UN human rights treaty bodies since the last UPR: CAT in May 2016; ICCPR in October 2014; CRC[26] in June 2013; and CRC-OP-SC in May 2015. Israel is set to appear before CEDAW on October 31, 2017 and is awaiting appearance dates from CERD and CRPD.

12. The State of Israel's commitment to human rights and its cooperation with UN bodies is underscored by the establishment, in 2011, of a joint inter-ministerial team, headed by the Ministry of Justice's Deputy Attorney General (International Law), for reviewing and implementing the concluding observations of the various human rights committees. This inter-ministerial team meets to examine the UN human rights committees' concluding observations and has made several significant changes related to domestic human rights legislation.[27]

B. The protection and promotion of human rights at the national level

1. Equality and non-discrimination[28]

13. Equality and non-discrimination are the cornerstones of the State of Israel's democracy and are enshrined in its Declaration of Independence and Basic Laws. Israel's commitment to these core values and rights has been reiterated time and again in laws and court rulings and is repeatedly re-affirmed and promoted through legislative and policy measures.

(a) Gender-based equality[30]

14. Israel's unwavering dedication to gender-based equality has not faltered—from the enactment of the *Equal Rights for Women Law* 5711-1951 just three years after the establishment of the State of Israel, until now.

15. Women's participation in the public sphere is valued and encouraged. In the current 20th Knesset, the proportion of women MKs[31] has grown to a record high of 27.5%[31], from 22.5% in the 19th Knesset. Two of these women serve as deputies to the Knesset speaker, five serve as chairpersons of Knesset Committees, and two belong to the Arab minority. In the current Government, the percentage of women ministers has grown from 9.7% to 16%. There are currently four women Government Ministers and one female Deputy Government Minister. 40% of the high-ranking positions in the Civil Service are filled by women, an increase from the 32.6% noted in Israel's last national report. In government companies, the percentage of female directors rose to 43%, reflecting a 10% increase from 2007[32].

16. Out of the 725 judges presiding in different courts throughout Israel, 369 (51%) are women. In October 2017, Esther Hayut assumed the role of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, becoming the third female of the past four Chief Judges in that position. In 2017, two women of Ethiopian descent were appointed as Magistrate Court judges, a groundbreaking moment in Israeli judicial history. On April 25, 2017, the first female Qadi[33] was appointed to serve in a Muslim Religious Court. Notably, this Qadi received the support of all nine members of the Judicial Appointments Committee.

17. On, May 26, 2015, the GOI established a Ministerial Committee on Social Equality, specifically designated to promote gender equality in various aspects of life.[34]

18. In March 2014, Amendment No. 3 to the *Male and Female Workers (Equal Pay) Law* 5756-1996 was adopted, which required public bodies that are obligated by law to submit reports regarding employees' salaries to include a gender-based wage index in order to expose discrepancies. Following a report by the Committee for the Advancement of Women in the Civil Service[35], which was established in 2014, the Commissioner issued guidelines which include criteria for setting salary components (standards for vehicle allowance, overtime hours, and on-call-hours), thereby narrowing the potential for discrepancies in salaries between women and men in the same position. In addition, the guidelines also require the employer to report varied salary components to the CSC[36], which not only improves transparency but also helps the CSC supervise and narrow salary gaps.

19. On March 21, 2017, the paid maternity leave period was extended from 14 to 15 weeks, in accordance with the criteria under Amendment No. 57 of the *Women's Employment Law* 5714-1954.[37] Additionally, this Amendment and Amendment No. 54 to the same law extend the entitlement of parental leave to fathers; *inter alia*, a father may take paid parental leave for a period of one work-week immediately following the birth of his child. Furthermore, under the law, a father may opt to take another seven days of parental leave at any time during the mother's parental leave.

20. The status of women in the IDF[38] continues to improve. The most prominent example of this is in the infantry, where the number of women is steadily rising, and new opportunities have become available for women. Due to concerns that the process of integrating ultra-Orthodox men into the IDF would lead to the exclusion of women in various positions in the IDF, Amendment No. 19 to the *Defence Service Law [Consolidated Version]* 5746-1986 was passed in 2014, banning such exclusion.[39]

21. Israel has focused efforts to facilitate greater access to justice by women, particularly minority women. In recent years, the Southern District of the LAA[40] of the MOJ identified cultural and economic barriers that prevent women from the Bedouin

population from accessing courts.[41] The LAA took several steps to address these issues, including: establishing a LAA branch in Rahat[42] in June 2016; strengthening cooperation between the LAA and NGOs as well as with the Authority for Development and Housing of the Bedouins in the Negev; enhancing the accessibility of legal aid for women victims of prostitution – a joint project of the Southern District of the LAA with the "Bishvilech" NGO; providing legal assistance to female victims of domestic violence; providing legal assistance for victims of trafficking; establishing "Access to Justice Stands" – counters located in courts that offer ad hoc legal aid to unrepresented people.

22. One ubiquitous challenge in modern society that Israel must also face is combating gender-based violence. The Government has attempted to tackle the problem head-on both internationally by spearheading an initiative within the framework of the Committee on the Status of Women at the United Nations, and domestically via various legislative amendments and enforcement efforts. Among these are the following:

(a) The UN Resolution on Preventing and Eliminating Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, which was introduced and primarily negotiated by Israel, was adopted in March 2017. The Resolution condemns all forms of sexual harassment, especially against women and girls, including harassment in the workplace, and emphasizes the need to take all necessary measures to prevent and eliminate such harassment. The Resolution, the first of its kind on this topic at the UN, emphasizes the important role of Member States in eliminating this phenomenon and places the primary responsibility upon employers to take measures to prevent such incidences. The Resolution also lays out several methods through which countries can combat and handle sexual harassment, including legislation, policies, education, awareness-raising programs and research.

(b) Amendment No. 20 of 2017 to the *Legal Aid Law* 5732-1972 entitles victims of serious sexual offenses to legal counsel from the moment an indictment is filed for the offense through the course of criminal proceedings and related administrative proceedings.

(c) Amendment No. 122 of 2016 to the *Penal Law* 5737-1977, added Section 347B to the Law, which prohibits consensual sexual relations between a clergyman and a person above the age of 18 who sought counsel from the clergyman, when the consent was obtained through the exploitation of the individual's mental dependence upon the clergyman.

(d) Amendment No. 14 of 2015 to the *Legal Aid Law* 5732-1972 provides that legal aid, including representation in civil court proceedings, will be provided without a financial eligibility test to victims of sexual offences in civil proceedings under the *Limitations on the Return of a Sex Offender to the Victim's Vicinity Law* 5765-2004.

(e) Amendment No. 5 of 2015 to the *Statute of Limitations Law* 5718-1958 allows for the possibility of extending the statute of limitations if the defendant, or her/his representative, knowingly misled the plaintiff, abused her/his power, threatened or exploited the plaintiff, including by means of sexual abuse.

(f) Amendment No. 10 of 2014 to the *Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law* 5758-1998 provides that publishing a photograph, film or recording of a person that focuses on his/her sexuality[43], in circumstances in which the publication is likely to humiliate or degrade him/her, and without his/her consent, constitutes a sexual harassment offence, punishable by five years of imprisonment.

(g) In July 2014 the *Prevention of Sexual Harassment Regulations* 5758-1998 were amended to require higher education institutions to increase awareness to prevent sexual harassment, including by: notifying students and employees about the regulations and ways to file a complaint; appointing two sexual harassment prevention officers with relevant training in institutions with 2,000 students or more. These institutions are also

obligated to file an annual report to the AAW[44], to the Knesset Committee for the Advancement of the Status of Women and Gender Equality (2014), and to the relevant regulatory body.

(h) In 2012, the Attorney General appointed an inter-ministerial team to examine ways to handle incidents involving the exclusion of women in the public sphere in light of an increase in the number of reports of such incidents. The Attorney General adopted the team's recommendations in May 2013 and a team was appointed to implement the recommendations. Among others, the following steps were taken: a dedicated email account was designated for this type of complaint; the MRS[45] and the Attorney General issued circulars indicating that segregating burial plots in cemeteries by gender is prohibited; the MOH[46] issued guidelines forbidding the exclusion and segregation of women at HMO branches and hospitals and demanding that modesty signs (signs calling, instructing, or demanding modest attire) be removed; the MOT[47] undertook extensive reviews to ensure that all public buses, even those operated in ultra-Orthodox communities, do not coerce segregated seating.

23. Four recent court decisions highlight the judiciary's significant role in safeguarding women's rights:

(a) On February 28, 2017, the HCJ[48] rejected two appeals that were merged together after being filed by two appellants who had refused to grant their respective wives a Jewish writ of divorce (Gett) for a lengthy period.[49] The appellants (separately) appealed the decision of the Great Rabbinical Court to approve various social sanctions that the Rabbinical Courts had imposed upon them, based on Jewish religious law, including alienating them from their communities and shaming them in public to force them to agree to grant the writ of divorce.[50] The Court ruled that due to the appellants' behavior, including the violation of judicial decisions obligating them to grant their wives a Gett, the Rabbinical Courts had the authority to impose all of these sanctions, except one recommendation (in one of the appellants' cases) to prohibit the performance of a Jewish burial for him.[51]

(b) The Supreme Court upheld a regional rabbinical court ruling which approved a divorce for a woman whose husband is in a vegetative state, and reversed a Great Rabbinical Court ruling which allowed a third party to appeal this decision. The Supreme Court emphasized that such an effort to try and make the woman an Aguna, a Jewish woman unable to re-marry (after the lower Rabbinical Court granted her a divorce) violates her basic right of human dignity, as enshrined in the *Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty* 5752-1992 and deprives her of her liberty. The Court concluded that this would be unconstitutional.[52]

(c) In December 2015, the Supreme Court upheld the right to file a class action lawsuit and grant damages in the wake of an ultra-Orthodox radio station's ban on women broadcasters.[53]

(d) On June 21, 2017, the Jerusalem Magistrate Court approved an agreement between El Al Airlines and a female passenger who had been asked to move from her assigned seat when an ultra-Orthodox male passenger refused to sit next to her. According to the agreement, which the court incorporated into its decision, an airline crew member may not, under any circumstances, ask a passenger to move from his/her assigned seat when the adjacent passenger will not sit beside him/her because of his/her gender.[54]

(b) LGBT rights[55]

24. Israel steadfastly protects the rights of its citizens to live freely according to their sexual orientation and gender identity and actively promotes the development of rights for the LGBT community.

25. Since the last cycle, there have been a number of notable legislative and administrative developments affecting the LGBT community, including:

(a) The September 2017 notice by the MOLSASS[56] that it supports changing the legislative criteria which requires an adoptive couple to be a "man and his wife", to a new gender-neutral standard that simply requires that adoptive parents have a stable and ongoing relationship.

(b) The introduction, in 2016, of a PIBA[57] policy that shortens the process by which a same-sex spouse of an Israeli citizen may receive a visa.[58]

(c) The 2014 adoption of Amendment No. 4 to the *Pupil's Rights Law* 5761-2000, adding sexual orientation and gender identity to the list of grounds upon which discrimination against pupils is prohibited.

(d) The 2014 modification of the template for identity cards by the MOI[59], allowing for the clear designation of same-sex parents.

26. Recent court decisions protecting the rights of same-sex couples in Israel include:

(a) A 2016 National Labor Court decision (overturning a previous ruling by the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Labor Court) held that the constitutional right of a same-sex couple to create a family enables it to benefit from the same entitlement terms granted to heterosexual families, as laid out in the *National Insurance Law*.[60] This ruling enshrines the principle of non-discrimination against same-sex couples with regard to National Insurance benefits.

(b) The 2014 Jerusalem District Court decision rejecting an appeal filed by a Guest House regarding whether a certain venue can refuse to hold a same-sex wedding. The Court stressed that the principle of equality was a fundamental principle of Israel's legal system and that preventing a same-sex couple from getting married at a certain venue is discriminatory.[61]

(c) The 2013 Tel Aviv-Jaffa Family Court ruling that a same-sex couple could be registered as parents and recognized as joint parents through a judicial parenthood order, without a social services' review.[62]

27. Israeli courts have also taken a clear stance against violence in the LGBT context. In April 2016, the Jerusalem District Court convicted Yishay Shlisel of murder, six counts of attempted murder and injury under aggravated circumstances, after he stabbed seven people in the Jerusalem Pride Parade in July 2015.[63] Shlisel was sentenced to life imprisonment with an additional 31 year imprisonment sentence and was ordered to compensate the deceased's family and other victims in the total amount of 2,064,000 NIS.[64]

28. Furthermore, Israel has played a significant role in promoting the rights of the LGBT community at the UN and beyond. The permanent mission of Israel to the UN is a long-standing member of the LGBT core group in New York. Israel actively fought to protect the mandate given to the Independent Expert on SOGI[65], voting several times in favor of the position and delivering supportive statements in the third and fifth committees and in the General Assembly. It has also co-sponsored many side events held by the core group to raise awareness and promote the rights of the LGBT Community. Finally, Israel is a founding member of the recently established ERC[66], a group of countries (outside the auspices of the UN) committed to promoting the rights of the LGBT community.

(c) Minority rights[67]

29. Israel strives to protect, promote, and integrate minorities, who comprise approximately 25.3% of Israel's population, and ensure that they have equal access to employment, education, and socio-economic rights, as well as full participation in political

processes. In the current 20th Knesset, there are thirteen Arab, one Bedouin and four Druze Knesset Members.[68]

Public representation

30. Due to the affirmative action measures described in Israel's last national report, there has been a steady increase in the employment rates of minorities in the Civil Service. As of October 2017, 10.1% of all Civil Service employees were Arabs, Bedouins, Druze and Circassians (compared to 8.4% in 2012 and 6.17% in 2007). Approximately 40% of these employees are women. These affirmative action efforts are ongoing and the government has designated hundreds of positions for these purposes.

31. Many Arab-Israeli employees within the Civil Service maintain senior-level positions, with decision-making authority. These employees serve in many capacities, including: investigative engineers, clinical psychologists, senior tax investigators, senior economists, senior electricians, geologists, department controllers, lawyers and educational supervisors. While there were 347 Arab, Bedouin, Druze and Circassian employees holding senior positions in 2006, that number rose to 562 in 2014.

Economic, social and cultural measures for the Arab, Bedouin, Druze and Circassian Communities

32. In recent years there have been several significant Government measures to empower the Arab population and to reduce gaps between that population and Israeli society in general. These efforts have already led to positive trends, like the consistent growth in employment figures for the Arab population in general and especially Arab women.

33. Several programs have been designed to benefit Israel's minorities. The Authority for Economic Development of the Arab Population, including the Druze and Circassian (hereinafter: the "Authority"), within the Ministry of Social Equality is currently implementing the following measures:

(a) Government Resolution No. 922, entitled "Government activities for the development of minority populations for the years 2016-2020", which implements a five-year plan (2016-2020) to further integrate Arab, Druze, Bedouin, Christian and Circassian populations in Israel through : education – by, *inter alia*, upgrading teaching quality, promoting educational programs, and allocating a budget for informal educational and extra-curricular activities; higher education – by increasing the rate of Arab students studying for their Bachelor's degree to 17% by 2025[69]; transportation infrastructure – by, *inter alia*, improving public transportation, paving new roads in Arab localities, and training Arab women as public transportation drivers; commerce and trade – through, *inter alia*, the expansion of industrial zones, the allocation of at least 50% of the employment budget to populations with low participation rates, and the allocation of at least 10% of the assistance budget of the Foreign Trade Administration to promoting the participation of the Arab population in foreign markets; employment – by, *inter alia*, establishing more child care centers[70], setting up additional Ryan centers[71] for the Druze and Circassian populations[72], and allocating 200 Million NIS[73] for the operation of these centers for the years 2017–2020; and public security – through the establishment of additional police stations and the recruitment of more Arab police personnel.

(b) Resolution No. 2365, entitled "Government plan for the development of Minority Localities (including Arab, Bedouin, Druze and Circassian local authorities) in 2015" which aims at, *inter alia*, improving transportation infrastructure including internal and external roads and public transportation; improving water and sewage systems; developing tourism arrangements; finalizing the development of industrial areas; providing

vocational training and support of micro hi-tech companies; constructing sports halls and courts; improving personal security and service to citizens including through the "City without Violence" Program. The total budget for this plan was 664 Million NIS[74] for 2015 and programs which were launched under this plan in 2015 are still ongoing.

(c) A special Resolution that was designed specifically to help develop and strengthen Druze localities for the years 2014–2017.[75] This Resolution aims to strengthen the Druze population in education – through the construction of additional classrooms and kindergartens, the development of educational programs for all ages, including preparation for higher education, enrichment and extra-curricular activities, teacher training etc. (with a total budget of 54 Million NIS[76]); employment – by promoting additional employment opportunities and strengthening social services (with a total budget of 13 Million NIS[77]); health services and infrastructures- via completion of zoning plans for these localities (with a budget of 8 Million NIS[78]); infrastructure- through the establishment and maintenance of religious sites and structures (10.4 Million NIS[79]), and the improvement of transportation infrastructure (80 Million NIS[80]).

(d) In addition to the above-mentioned Resolutions, the Authority has been working with the Forum of Bedouin Authorities' Leaders and 15 Government Ministries and related professional bodies on a five-year plan for the years **2016–2020** for the Bedouin localities in Northern Israel, with a total budget of 1.7 Billion NIS[81] for five years.

34. Aside from the above-mentioned initiatives, in 2014, the MOE[82] and the CHE[83] together with the Irteka Scholarship Fund and other private benefactors, offered 650 scholarships for the 2015 academic year to Arab, Druze and Circassian students studying for their first degree. 6.5 Million NIS[84] were allocated for these scholarships. Preparations are being made for another allocation, to roughly 650 new recipients.

35. The CHE has also started the process of establishing and operating a state-funded academic college in an Arab locality in northern Israel. The CHE invited the submission of proposals in December 2015. This institute will render higher education more accessible to the Arab population living in northern Israel, especially to women.

36. The Government has initiated a number of development plans that address the concerns and needs of Bedouins. All of the plans involve active participation of the relevant communities. There are currently 18 Bedouin localities with approved outline plans and additional development plans are underway in several other Bedouin towns. Rahat, for example, will almost triple in size (from 8,797 dunams today to 22,767 dunams). The project is estimated to cost approximately 500 Million NIS[85]. All of these plans include the construction of infrastructure such as schools, health clinics, running water, electricity, roads, pavements, etc. The Government is encouraging movement to regulated localities by providing financial incentives which include, *inter alia*, the provision of land plots for free or at very low cost, and compensation for the demolition of unauthorized structures.

(d) Racial discrimination[86]

37. The State of Israel condemns all forms of racial discrimination and its Government maintains a consistent policy prohibiting such discrimination. In recent years, Israeli law enforcement authorities have intensified their efforts to combat hate crimes by forming special units designated to tackle such phenomena.

38. In January 2014, a public campaign was launched to educate the public that discrimination and racism constitute a criminal offence. As part of this campaign, a special internet site and hotline were created to provide information and assistance to persons affected by discriminatory acts.

39. To further counter racial discrimination, the MOE initiated several efforts to advance the principles of democracy and coexistence in its curricula. These include *inter alia*, the Tolerance, Prevention of Racism, and Coexistence Program, a multi-year program designed for all ages and populations, that focuses on tolerance, acceptance of persons from other groups, coexistence and the prevention of racism; the "Living Together Program", a program facilitating meetings between Jewish and Arab pupils, with the aim of working together for the benefit of both local populations;[87] the "Holocaust to Human Rights" Dialogue – which emphasizes the importance of democracy, human rights and pluralism; "Ya Salam" – a program to promote coexistence and equality through joint Hebrew and Arabic classes in both Jewish and Arab schools.

Judicial decisions against racial discrimination

40. The judiciary continues to protect minorities from racial discrimination. Recent rulings include:

(a) A March 2015 HCJ decision that rejected a petition against various security inspection methods that were employed at Israeli airports and purportedly involved ethnic profiling (because the respondents had since begun to use new non-discriminatory security inspection methods), but awarded the petitioner's expenses because of its role in bringing about important changes in airport inspection methods.[88]

(b) The September 2015 Rishon-Le'Zion Magistrate Court ruling which held that bumping Arab passengers from a domestic flight to allow Jewish passengers to board in their stead on the basis of so-called 'security considerations' violates the *Prohibition of Discrimination in Products, Services and in Entry into Places of Entertainment and Public Places Law*, which prohibits discriminating against persons based on their ethnic origin and violates the *Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty*'s guarantee of human dignity.[89] Accordingly, the Court awarded sizeable damages to the plaintiffs despite the fact that they ultimately boarded the flight.[90]

(c) A March 2016 Nazareth Labor Court ruling[91] in favor of a Druze plaintiff who was fired on the basis of race in violation of Section 2 of the *Equal Employment Opportunities Law* 5748-1988 and was awarded compensation in the amount of 54,804 NIS[92], and legal fees in the amount of 10,800 NIS[93].

Israelis of Ethiopian descent

41. In the wake of allegations of discrimination and popular protests, Israel implemented a number of measures geared towards Israelis of Ethiopian descent. In February 2014, the Government passed a groundbreaking resolution[94] tasking the MOIA[95] and other Government Ministries to develop new policies for increasing the integration of Israelis of Ethiopian descent and abolishing discrimination against them. Over 3,000 Israelis of Ethiopian descent – including public figures, heads of NGOs, professionals and activists, participated in over 60 round-table meetings with government officials and policy makers to develop these policies. This process yielded a comprehensive document with six guiding principles to serve as the basis for all new policies to be implemented concerning Israelis of Ethiopian descent, including: integration rather than segregation; acknowledging the diversity within the Ethiopian Israeli community itself; empowering families; closing gaps; encouraging excellence and leadership within the community; and educating Israeli society to eliminate all forms of discrimination against Israelis of Ethiopian descent. By the end of 2014, all Government Ministries involved in the process had established new policies guided by these overriding principles.

42. In July 2015, the Policy Principles were adopted in Government Resolution No. 324, which created a four year inter-ministerial program designed to adopt clear policies,

including the establishment of a special unit in the PMO[96] to oversee the implementation. In addition, the Ministerial Committee for the Advancement of the Integration into the Israeli Society of Israeli Citizens of Ethiopian Descent (hereinafter: "the Ministerial Committee") was established, headed by the Prime Minister.

43. In January 2016, the Ministerial Committee approved a resolution directing the MOJ's Director General to create and head an inter-ministerial team charged with developing an action plan to deal with racism against persons of Ethiopian descent. This team was comprised of senior officials[97], in addition to representatives of the CSC, Israeli Police, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commissioner, representatives of the industrial sector, and representatives of Israeli citizens of Ethiopian descent.

44. In August 2016, the Ministerial Committee adopted 53 recommendations made by the inter-ministerial team.[98] The Ministerial Committee also decided to implement several of the team's recommendations, including, *inter alia*: the establishment of a new unit within the MOJ for the coordination of the fight against racism; the appointment by the Justice Minister of an independent public commission to assist and advise the coordination unit; the appointment of an individual in every Government Ministry to serve as a focal point and be in charge of the fight against discrimination and racism; the provision of free legal representation in discrimination claims relating to access and entry to public places; positive representation of persons of Ethiopian descent in the public sphere – including public places and the media; and the creation of an expedited procedure for the employment of persons of Ethiopian descent with academic degrees in the public sector. The new unit in the MOJ is also tasked, *inter alia*, with the implementation of the inter-ministerial team's recommendations; fielding complaints concerning discrimination and racism and involving the relevant authorities; composing an annual report regarding the unit's responsibilities. The Director General of the MOJ is required to report to the Ministerial Committee on the implementation of the abovementioned recommendations.

45. The Israeli Government, by means of Resolutions adopted between October 2015 and February 2016,[99] approved special programming that involves over 10 Ministries and Government agencies in the following areas: education; integration; employment; family and community. The programs created under these initiatives include efforts to educate the public and alter prevailing attitudes; minimize gaps; and promote leadership and excellence. The plans formulated by various Ministries pursuant to these Resolutions include targets for a four-year plan (2016–2019) and relevant budgets, with a total budget of approximately 500 Million NIS[100].

46. In addition to the administrative and legislative measures that demonstrate Israel's commitment to non-discrimination, the Israeli Police have likewise shown such dedication by initiating a detailed plan to prevent discrimination and reduce points of friction with this population. The plan includes, *inter alia*, training officers how to police in a multi-cultural setting; adding local community police officers who offer special programs and serve as a liaison between the community and police; increasing the recruitment and promotion of Israeli citizens of Ethiopian descent within the Police and increasing the number of Amharic-speaking dispatchers (100). Though final statistics are not yet available, there are indications that these measures have led to a reduction in the number of arrests and detentions of Ethiopian Israelis, especially among youth.

47. There have also been numerous judicial decisions rendered regarding racial discrimination against this group. In one recent example from January 2016, the Haifa Regional Labor Court ruled in favor of an Israeli woman of Ethiopian descent who claimed that she suffered discrimination due to her ethnic origin in violation of the *Equal Employment Opportunities Law* 5748-1988. The Court held that the plaintiff had proven that the respondent company had discriminated against her and had refused to hire her due to her ethnic origin without examining her relevant employment skills. Due to the severity

of the case, the Court awarded compensation in the amount of 50,000 NIS[101] to the plaintiff.[102]

(c) Rights of persons with disabilities[103]

48. Israel is proud of its achievements regarding the protection and promotion of human rights for all persons with disabilities and remains committed to promoting a disability rights agenda. Israel devotes tremendous resources to enabling disabled people to fulfill their potential, maintain their dignity and freedom, and enjoy equal rights.

49. In furtherance of the two principal sources of legislation mandating accessibility to public places and services, the *Equal Rights for Persons with Disabilities Law* 5758-1998 (the "*Equal Rights Law*") and the *Planning and Building Law* 5725-1965, additional Regulations have been promulgated relating to a wide variety of places and services that require accessibility adjustments. As of January 2017, 21 detailed Accessibility Regulations had been adopted. As required by the *Equal Rights Law*, these Regulations were drafted in consultation with organizations working on behalf of persons with disabilities. Important work is ongoing in this area, with 13 draft Accessibility Regulations in various stages of the legislative process.[104]

50. These aforementioned Regulations have greatly increased the scope of accessibility requirements relating to sites and services, including: the construction of public buildings (existing and new); educational facilities (existing); open public places like cemeteries and beaches; archaeological sites; national parks and nature reserves; transportation services (including buses, trains, taxi cabs, and rental cars); information accessibility and telecommunication services. Recent legislative measures include an amendment to a Transportation Regulation, addressing the accessibility of the light rail. Other measures address accessibility provisions for professional training courses, health facilities and higher education institutions.

51. The Commission for Equal Rights of Persons with Disabilities in the MOJ works to ensure that these accessibility regulations are implemented by, *inter alia*, publishing data and by training officials, as well as by means of a specialized accessibility enforcement department that operates nation-wide. Supervisors perform field surveys and are authorized to investigate, request documents, and inspect premises. They conduct over 1,000 such inspections annually and issue letters of warning to entities found not to be in compliance with accessibility Regulations. When necessary, they are authorized to issue an order obligating an entity to make accessibility adjustments. The violation of terms of an accessibility order is a criminal offence, punishable by a court-imposed fine. If an accessibility order has been issued to a public or private corporation, or to a local authority or government entity, officials may be held personally liable.

52. Employment discrimination against a person with disabilities, by reason of his/her disability or against family members of a person with disabilities by reason of that disability, is strictly prohibited under the *Equal Rights Law*. Section 8(e) defines discrimination as including the failure to make adjustments required by virtue of the special needs of a person with a disability in order to facilitate her/his employment.[105]

53. Recognizing the challenges faced by persons with disabilities in seeking employment opportunities, the *Equal Rights Law* provides that if an employer with over 25 workers finds that disabled persons are not appropriately represented, the employer must enable such integration, including by making adjustments to the workplace. Recent legislation has defined "appropriate representation" for public and private sector employers and has established implementation or enforcement mechanisms.[106]

54. Other recent measures aimed at improving the lives of PWD include the launch of a public awareness campaign to promote the rights of persons with disabilities and the

accessibility requirements of public places. From 2011 until 2016, the campaign included television, radio, internet, new-media and newspaper coverage in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian. The annual budget of these campaigns was 1,500,000 NIS[107].

(f) Religious freedoms[108]

55. As underlined in the *Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty*, freedom of religion is an important facet of Israeli society, and consists of both the freedom of religion[109] as well as the freedom to practice one's religion.

56. Israeli Law guarantees freedom of worship and ensures access to holy places to members of all faiths. The *Protection of Holy Places Law* 5727-1967 safeguards all holy places from desecration and subjects violators to significant prison sentences.

57. Holy sites in sensitive areas are guarded by the Police in order to protect tourists, visitors, and worshippers and maintain public order.

58. The GOI takes the desecration of holy sites very seriously and the Prime Minister, President, and Defence Minister have all denounced such actions in the harshest terms.[110] As a matter of policy, Israel investigates and prosecutes the offenders in such situations. For example, on July 28, 2015, an indictment was filed in Nazareth District Court against two suspects in relation to the arson at the Church of the Multiplication of the Loaves and Fish in Nahum Village in June 2015. One of the suspects was charged with arson under aggravated circumstances, defacing real estate with a hostile motive towards the public, conspiracy to commit a crime, conspiracy to commit other offences, using a car in the commission of a crime, obstructing a police officer, and violation of a legal order. The second suspect was charged with providing means for the commission of a crime and conspiracy to commit other offences. The first suspect was convicted in July 2017, while the second was acquitted of all charges against him. In addition to prosecuting the offenders, the GOI further displayed its commitment to religious freedom and the sanctity of holy sites, by transferring 1.5 million NIS[111] in January 2017 for the complete renovation of this Church.

59. Israeli courts have also protected those who prefer to receive civilian over religious services. On September 4, 2014, the Kfar Saba Magistrate Court held, in two separate cases brought by spouses of deceased individuals who had desired to have a civilian burial, that the State had not fulfilled its legal obligation in accordance with *The Right to Alternative Civil Burial Law* 5756-1996, which requires that alternative cemeteries be established in various regions throughout Israel. The Magistrate Court ruled, *inter alia*, that there were not sufficient civil burial cemeteries available and that the civil burial cemeteries that did exist were not in close proximity to the relevant populations. The Court also determined that the MRS did not disseminate information regarding civil burial options to the public and ordered the MRS to reimburse the plaintiffs.[112] As of September 2017, the number of cemeteries for alternative civilian burial had increased to 23[113]. The list of cemeteries is now published on the MRS' website.

60. In addition to Jewish and civilian burial, persons of other faiths are buried according to their own customs in Israel. Likewise, in an appeal brought by the mother of a transgender woman who requested in her will that her body be cremated upon her death, the Supreme Court upheld the Jerusalem District Court decision to honor the deceased's request.[114]

61. The GOI has made efforts to accommodate the needs and lifestyles of employees of different religions. The CSC provides holiday and vacation time according to employees' relevant religious holidays, such that Muslim employees are entitled to a day off during Ramadan and Christians can choose Sunday as their day off from work. Only recently, in

May 2016, the CSC approved, *ex gratia*, that Muslim employees of the SBB could report on-call shifts during Ramadan.[117]

2. Children's rights[118]

(a) Education

62. Israel remains determined to protect children's rights and their welfare and has continued to legislate and act towards the betterment of all children. Israel is a signatory to numerous international conventions[119] and new policies and legislation give effect to the rights and obligations contained therein.

63. Israel's educational system is based on the principle that every child receive an equal opportunity for education, as enshrined in Section 2(B) of the *National Education Law* 5713-1953 (*"The National Education Law"*). Similarly, Section 5(A)(1) of the *Pupil's Rights Law* prohibits any form of discrimination concerning the registration of pupils by governmental and local authorities or any educational institution.

64. Every parent has the right to choose between public and private kindergartens and between secular or religious ones. No tuition is charged for children enrolled in public kindergartens.[120] This right to free and compulsory education is granted to every child living in Israel, regardless of his/her citizenship or legal status. Since the last UPR cycle, a number of important reforms have been adopted, including the 2016 Amendment No. 35 to *Compulsory Education Law* 5709-1949, which lowered the compulsory age of enrollment of children in kindergartens from five to three.

65. Another important recent reform, Government Resolution No. 2659, which expands governmental support of after-school day-care programs, was adopted on May 21, 2017.[121] This resolution enlarged the financial support granted by the MOE to after-school day-care centers, and supervision of the programs, ensuring the quality of service provided and the pedagogical standards.

(b) Health

66. As of January 2017, children below the age of 15 became entitled, under the *National Health Insurance Law* 1994-5754, to receive free basic dental care treatment and other treatments with low deductibles.[122] The treatments will be further extended in one year to include children age 15, and in two years to cover those who are 16, and so on, up until the age of 18.

67. In 2014 the Government enacted, *inter alia*, the *Supervision of the Quality of Food and Proper Nutrition in Education Institutions Law* 5774-2014 which obligates the State to supervise the nutritional values of all foods sold and served in educational institutions.

(c) Economic and social

68. Pursuant to the *National Insurance Regulations (Long-Term Savings for Child)* 5777-2016, there is a new long-term savings account program in Israel. As of January 2017, the NII[123] contributes 50 NIS[124] each month into a long-term savings plan for each child eligible for this allowance until the child reaches the age of 18. The parent may choose to have the child's funds held in a designated savings account that is managed within the framework of either an investment provident fund or bank savings account. The parents have the option to match the NII contribution and deposit an additional sum of 50 NIS[125] monthly for the child. In addition, every child receives 250 NIS[126] upon reaching the age of 3 and 250 NIS[127] upon reaching the ages of 12 and 13 respectively. If a child keeps the funds in the savings account until age 21, he/she will receive 500 NIS[128] at that time.

69. Following the 2016 Amendment No. 55 to the *Womens' Employment Law* 5714-1954, either the mother or father of a newborn may be absent from work for one hour a day for the first four months following parental leave, without it impacting their salary. Civil servants that are parents of young children are granted even greater flexibility.[127] Like the above-mentioned parental leave amendments, this amendment promotes greater parental involvement in raising children and helps families adjust better to their work-life balance.

70. Amendment No. 6 of 2013 to the *Marriage Age Law* 5710-1950 raised the minimum age for marriage from 17 to 18. Anyone who marries a minor, officiates at a minor's wedding, or enables the marriage of a minor under his/her guardianship may be sentenced to two years of imprisonment or a fine.

3. Access to justice[128]

71. The Supreme Court is Israel's highest judicial instance.[129] The Court has 15 justices, who usually sit on panels of three. Under Article 15 of the *Basic Law: The Judiciary* of 1984, the Supreme Court serves two primary purposes: it is the court of first instance for constitutional cases and the highest court of appeals, as well. Thousands of cases and petitions are heard annually.

72. The Court offers broad standing rules, allowing all persons, including non-citizens and non-residents, to directly petition it, on a very wide range of issues. The Supreme Court rules on such petitions, and when justified, issues injunctions against the Government or other relief as appropriate.

73. Free legal aid is offered in Israel, under certain circumstances, via the PDO[130] which provides legal representation throughout criminal proceedings, and the LAA which offers legal counsel to persons who cannot afford legal representation in civil proceedings. Eligibility for LAA depends upon the subject-matter of the case, the financial ability of the applicant, and the likelihood of success of the legal proceedings.[131]

74. In November 2014, a pilot program was launched creating Community Courts for criminal proceedings, which employ a judicial and rehabilitative approach aimed at reducing incarceration and preventing recidivism. By providing personal assistance during the process, tailoring a rehabilitation plan to defendants' needs and circumstances and, in appropriate cases, offering the assistance of the community, this framework provides perpetrators of crimes an incentive to rehabilitate themselves and the Court an opportunity to spare defendants from imprisonment if they complete their individualized rehabilitation plan.

4. Economic rights[132]

75. Following an agreement in late 2014 between the Presidium of Business Organizations and the General Federation of Trade Unions, which was later ratified in legislation, the minimum wage in Israel was incrementally increased from 4,300 NIS monthly[133] in 2014 to 5,000 NIS[134] monthly in January 2017.[135] This increase not only improves the lives of low-wage earners but also provides a greater incentive for unemployed individuals to work.

5. Environmental protections

76. Israel ratified the Paris Agreement[136] on November 14, 2016 and the Agreement entered into force in Israel on December 22, 2016.

77. As part of its commitments under the Agreement, Israel submitted its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), which is a national plan for emissions reductions.[137] According to its NDC, by 2030, Israel intends to reduce its per capita greenhouse gas

emissions by 26% below 2005 levels. Israel also set an interim target of 15% reduction of 2005 levels by 2025.

78. Recently, Israel became a full member of the Umbrella Group, a coalition of non-EU[138] developed countries[139]. This group provides a forum in which members consult each other regarding negotiations on the implementation of the Agreement.

79. Israel is also deepening its relationship with UNEP[140], including by providing financial and technical support to UN Environment projects in Africa.

80. Israel plays an active role as a member of the Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, and in this vein ratified the Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management in the Mediterranean on February 4, 2016.

81. In the last reporting cycle, Israel also adopted a number of new laws relating to environmental protection:

(a) On January 1, 2017 the *Law to Reduce the Use of Disposable Bags* 5776-2016, took effect. This law substantially reduces the number of plastic bags used by the public by charging for plastic bags in supermarkets. Within the first three months of this law coming into effect, there was a reduction of up to 80% of plastic bags purchased by supermarkets for distribution to the public.

(b) The *Law for the Regulation of the Practice of Pest Control* 5776-2016 came into effect on June 1, 2016 and regulates pest exterminators to ensure safe and environmentally sound practices.[141]

(c) The *Electrical and Electronic Equipment and Batteries Law* 5772-2012 which came into effect on March 1, 2014 along with a number of ancillary regulations, imposes extended producer responsibility on manufacturers and importers of electrical and electronic equipment, prohibits the burial of waste equipment and batteries and requires that they be recycled.

6. Prisoners' rights (Protection of persons subjected to detention)

82. On June 13, 2017, in a case concerning the living conditions of prisoners in Israel brought by several human rights NGOs, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the State must provide, within 18 months, 4.5 square meters of living space for each prisoner or detainee, as required under Section 2(8) of the *Prisons Regulation (Imprisonment Conditions)* 5770-2010, instead of the 3.16 square meters that was typically apportioned in most Israeli prisons.[142] The Court stressed that having a minimal living space is an essential condition for the protection of a prisoner's right to human dignity. In its decision, the Court included a detailed reference to the right for adequate living space of prisoners under international human rights law.[143]

83. Recently, Israel has focused more attention on the treatment of convicted offenders in order to maximize their potential to integrate into a normative lifestyle upon their release from prison and decrease the likelihood of recidivism. In August 2016, the Government adopted the main recommendations of the Public Committee for the Examination of the Punishment and Treatment of Convicted Offenders, which had been established in 2011 to study alternatives to punishment and ways to treat convicted offenders, with the aim of preventing recidivism to the extent possible.[144] The recommendations that were adopted include:

(a) the establishment of a research and information team in the Ministry of Justice to examine the effectiveness of different means of punishment and to collect statistical, comparative and other information regarding punishments, rehabilitation and court sentences, the scope of a given criminal phenomenon and more;

(b) the expansion of the existing model of "Community Courts" in order to reduce incarceration levels;[145]

(c) community service as an alternative to imprisonment when the prison sentence is 9 months or less;

(d) the establishment of a team, headed by the Deputy Attorney General (Criminal), to examine alternatives to punishment, with an emphasis on alternatives to prison sentences.

84. One alternative to incarceration that Israel has used since 2005 as part of a pilot program and which has been extended by temporary measures, is electronic monitoring of detainees released on bail and those released from imprisonment on parole. In 2014, the Knesset passed the *Electronic Monitoring of Detainees and Conditionally Released Prisoners Law (Legislative Amendments)* 5775-2014, which permanently established this program.

7. The fight against trafficking in persons

85. Israel has made remarkable progress in recent years in the continuing struggle to eliminate trafficking in persons. The Government of Israel continues to participate actively in global efforts to combat trafficking and has shared its knowledge and experience in this field both internationally and domestically[146] and while hosting study visits by foreign delegations, like the July 2016 study visit from Albania on compensation for trafficking victims[147], and the September 2016 visit from Moldova[148] on organ trafficking. MASHAV[149] continues to conduct its bi-annual international conference for judges and justices on this topic[150] in cooperation with various international organizations including the OSCE[151]; IOM[152]; the UNODC[153]; and the U.S. Government and to host an annual International Workshop on "Combating Violence against Women and Children", in cooperation with UNESCO[154]. At the end of the June 2016 workshop, the participants presented the Haifa declaration 2016: "A Call for Action from the Participants of MASHAV MCTC Course on Combating Violence against Women and Children".

86. Israel's legislature is also actively engaged in this issue. The Knesset Subcommittee on Combating Trafficking in Women and Prostitution was reestablished in February 2016. The Subcommittee collaborates with relevant government entities and civil society organizations. The various authorities and NGOs know they may turn to the Subcommittee for help in resolving specific problems or in advancing various urgent matters in legislation.

87. In 2016, the NATU[155] created a new inter-ministerial forum, comprised of legal advisors from all relevant Government Ministries. The inter-ministerial forum, which met in 2016-2017 aims to build knowledge and expertise within the legal departments of each Ministry, and strengthen collaboration between the various Ministries. NATU also established an internet forum enabling updates and direct communication between the varied agencies.

88. Recent bilateral agreements for foreign workers serve as a further safeguard against trafficking in persons. The pilot agreements signed with Nepal and Sri Lanka in 2015 and 2016, respectively, aim to recruit a limited number of qualified caregivers through a transparent process that includes mechanisms designed to eliminate the payment of illegal recruitment fees by workers. As such, these workers arrive in Israel without the unreasonable debts previously incurred by workers. In addition, the applicants to the program undergo a sixty-hour professional course prepared by Israel and a pre-departure orientation in which they receive information regarding their legal rights and obligations.

89. In 2016, special efforts were made to train relevant officials who had not yet received TIP[156] training. For example, PIBA's border officials in Eilat, a city which is

becoming a significant entry point, were trained to identify possible victims of trafficking. In addition, the NATU provides guiding principles to identify victims of trafficking, and distributes a book to every labor inspector containing a list of criteria and procedures to identify trafficking victims.

90. Several important judicial decisions in 2016 manifest Israel's commitment to eliminating trafficking in persons:

(a) The Supreme Court rejected an appeal and upheld the conviction of a Jerusalem couple for holding a person under conditions of slavery.[177] The case made clear that the offense can exist even when no violence or physical barriers have been placed in the way of an individual's freedom, and even when a similarly situated person may have been able to escape.

(b) In July 2016 an indictment was filed against two defendants who had recruited women from former Soviet Union countries via the internet to come to Israel and engage in prostitution. One defendant also approached a Ukrainian citizen to recruit women for prostitution. The defendants had caused 15 women to come to Israel and provide sexual services. The defendants were sentenced to imprisonment, a fine and forfeiture of cash.[178]

(c) An indictment was filed against a defendant who lured women from Russia and the Ukraine to enter Israel and provide sexual services by promising them high earnings as masseurs and the chance to reside in luxury apartments, along with his partner, who managed the apartments and was responsible for informing the women of the terms of employment. Some of the women were required to perform sexual acts on the defendants and to allow the defendants to "examine" them. As part of a plea bargain in September 2016, the defendants were sentenced to four years imprisonment and were required to pay a fine of 5,000 NIS[179] and compensation to the complainants. Both defendants have appealed the verdict.[180]

91. The GOI's concerted efforts to prosecute cases involving Organ Trafficking culminated in indictments against two trafficking networks in 2016. This allowed, *inter alia*, a thorough examination of the unique characteristics of each network and advanced efforts to learn how to prevent the continuation of this abhorrent phenomenon.

(a) In November 2016, an indictment was filed against seven defendants who persuaded economically vulnerable Israelis to sell their kidneys and found patients willing to pay a significantly higher price for the kidney than the fee the defendants gave to the donors. The illegal transplants were carried out in Turkey.[181]

(b) In December 2016, an indictment was filed against three defendants charged with operating an organ trafficking network that sold "transplant packages" to Israeli citizens. Donors were presented as altruistic, but were actually individuals with financial and personal difficulties, recruited from CIS[182] countries. The surgeries were performed in a third country (Thailand, Philippines, Turkey, and Bulgaria). While the recipients paid the defendants for the transplant, the donors only received about 1/8[th] of that amount, while the defendants kept the remaining funds. A hearing in this case is scheduled for March 2018, while two of the defendants remain in custody.[183]

92. The *Anti-Trafficking Law (Legislation Amendments)* 5767-2006 established a special fund, where forfeited property and fines from trafficking and slavery offenses are deposited and dedicated to various causes in combating TIP – with a special emphasis on victim protection and compensation. The law gives precedence to victim protection and rehabilitation, ordering that at least half of the funds each year be allocated to that purpose. In 2016, the fund began its operations – having finally accumulated sufficient funds. A call for applications was published in ten languages, and applications were received from NGOs

and victims of offences. The decisions regarding the allocation of the funds are made by a special committee, comprised of government officials and public representatives.

C. New and emerging issues, including advances and challenges in that regard

1. Polygamy

93. The practice of polygamy deleteriously impacts women and children and the status of women in society in general, and as such, Israel continues to struggle to eliminate the practice. However, Israel, like other countries with traditional communities, encounters opposition. According to recent findings of the NII, in 2016, there were 1,762 cases of polygamy in Israel, most of them within the Bedouin population in the south of Israel.

94. Several efforts have been made to confront this challenge. First, in January 2017, the GOI adopted Resolution No. 2345, which established an Inter-Ministerial Committee tasked with handling the issue of polygamy and called for the development of a strategic plan to address this phenomenon. Second, the Attorney General published Guideline No. 4.1112, entitled "The polygamy offence" on January 23, 2017. The goal of the Guideline is to enhance effective enforcement of the polygamy offence under Section 176 of the *Penal Law* and to augment its punishments. The Guideline describes the destructive implications that polygamy has on women and children, including its impact on a child's well-being and development; its economic and emotional implications upon women; and its general negative effect on the status of women in society.

2. Prostitution

95. In July 2017, the Knesset preliminarily approved two bills that make paying for sexual services a punishable crime and provide rehabilitation services to survivors of prostitution. The GOI intends to present a proposal on this issue, incorporating these two bills.

96. In 2016, after several years of efforts, the National Survey Regarding Prostitution, a collaboration of the MPS[164] and the MOLSASS, was completed. The survey yielded important and sometimes surprising findings that explained the phenomenon and may help improve existing services for persons formerly involved in prostitution and create new ways to handle the issue. As the result of the study, an additional 1,000,000 NIS[165] was allocated to expand the services rendered to prostitutes and further budget increases are expected in the coming years.

97. In December 2016, Amendment No. 127 of the *Penal Law* entered into effect, amending Section 203C of the *Penal Law* and increasing the penalty for the offence of procuring an act of prostitution from a minor from three years to five years' imprisonment. While receiving commercial sexual services from minors has been an offence since 2000, this amendment increases the severity of the punishment for the offense, thereby changing its status to a felony. The amendment, also in accordance with a CRC Committee recommendation to the GOI, further enhanced the rights and protections afforded to victims.

98. The State Attorney's Office, together with NATU, recently conducted an examination of cases relating to the prostitution of minors which were closed for lack of evidence, in order to understand the evidentiary difficulties involved. The State Attorney has reiterated the need to enhance and prioritize enforcement efforts to the Head of the Investigations and Intelligence Division in the Police. The Police have been improving enforcement efforts with regard to minors involved in prostitution, through ongoing efforts

to improve cooperation between the Police, the MOLSASS, MOH, MOE and the ELEM NGO. Plans are underway to expand the protection programs for minors in prostitution, and to establish ten more centers for the treatment of minors and young people in prostitution, beyond the existing five.

99. The new inter-ministerial forum comprised of representatives from the legal departments of all relevant Government Ministries discussed above in connection with the fight against TIP, is also tasked with the prevention of prostitution and related law enforcement.[166]

D. Challenges which would require the support of the international community

100. Like other countries around the world, Israel remains concerned by the constant threat of terrorism and is threatened by the escalating levels of incitement to violence and recruitment of children to commit acts of terror. There are abundant and pervasive resources available to contemporary terrorists and terror organizations are quick to adapt to new modes of online exploitation. Through social media, online chatrooms and other user-friendly technologies, the internet has become a dangerous platform for inspiring martyrdom and promoting violent extremism. Israel is deeply invested in combatting the challenge of online hatred and abuse of social media platforms for the sake of terror, while simultaneously being careful to preserve individuals' rights to freedom of expression. We continue to work with the international community to share best practices and find solutions for this global challenge.

101. On June 15, 2016, as part of Israel's ongoing battle against terrorism, the GOI enacted *The Counter Terrorism Law* 5776-2016. The Law provides, among other things, updated definitions for "terrorist organization", "terrorist act" and "membership in a terrorist organization"; detailed and streamlined procedures for the designation of terrorist organizations, and enhanced enforcement tools, both criminal and financial. This comprehensive law is part of an effort to provide law enforcement authorities with more effective tools to combat modern terrorist threats while incorporating additional safeguards to prevent violations of individual human rights, like due process mechanisms to challenge designations. The Law does not discriminate on the grounds of race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin and does not subject individuals to racial or ethnic profiling or stereotyping.

102. Israel, as the State in which the Jewish people realize their right to self-determination, is alarmed by the upswing in Anti-Semitic incidents throughout the globe and hopes to collaborate with international actors in facing this challenge. One step forward in this direction was the first ever General Assembly session addressing the rise in global Anti-Semitism on January 20, 2015. The permanent mission of Israel to the UN managed, with the support of the US, Canada and the EU, to convene this session in the context of combatting racism and xenophobia. The outcome of the session, a joint statement signed by 51 Member States, was later endorsed and circulated by the Secretary General.[167] As a follow-up to the session, a High Level forum on Anti-Semitism met in New York on September 7, 2016. The event included multiple expert panels and civil society participation.

Notes

[1] Universal Periodic Review.
[2] A/HRC/RES/16/21.

[3] A/HRC/DEC/17/119.
[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
[5] Ministry of Justice.
[6] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
[7] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
[8] International Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
[9] Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.
[10] International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
[11] Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
[12] Government of Israel.
[13] World Intellectual Property Organization.
[14] Persons with Disabilities.
[15] These are amendments to the *Copyrights Law and the Performers and Broadcasters Rights Law* 5744-1984.
[16] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
[17] United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner.
[18] United Nations Children's Fund.
[19] United Nations Secretary General.
[20] Former UNSG Ban Ki-Moon visited in 2014 and 2016.
[21] UNSG Guterres visited in August 2017.
[22] United Nations Human Rights Council.
[23] This visit occurred in September 2016.
[24] International Committee of the Red Cross.
[25] UPR Recommendations 136.32, 136.33, 136.34, 136.35, 136.36, 136.37, 136.40, 136.42, 136.44, 136.45, 136.50.
[26] Convention on the Rights of the Child.
[27] For example, the team's work led to the transfer of the Inspector for Complaints against the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) from the ISA to the MOJ after various Human Rights Treaty Bodies raised concerns in their Concluding Observations about the lack of independence of the Inspector's office from the subjects of its investigations. Another example is the team's role in increasing the penalty issued for accepting sexual services from a minor to reflect 2015 CRC Concluding Observations.
[28] UPR Recommendations 136.17, 136.18, 136.55, 136.58, 136.59.
[29] UPR Recommendations 136.19, 136.53, 136.56, 136.60, 136.62, 136.64, 136.81, 136.82, 136.91, 136.92, 136.101.
[30] Member of Knesset.
[31] There are currently 33 women MKs.
[32] The percentage of female directors in government companies was 33% in 2007 and 39% in 2011.
[33] Judge of a Muslim Religious Court.
[34] The Committee was established pursuant to *Government Resolution No. 36* (May 26, 2015).
[35] This Committee is more commonly known as "The Stauber Committee".
[36] Civil Service Commission.
[37] Women who have worked for less than one year at their place of employment when they take maternity leave receive 8 weeks of paid maternity leave.
[38] Israel Defense Forces.
[39] The Amendment (No. 19), stipulates that "The status and integration of a veteran woman in the defence service will not be prejudiced on account of the service of graduates of yeshivas and ultra-Orthodox religious institutions in the defence service under this chapter". Furthermore, the Amendment obliges the Minister of Defence to annually report on the effect of the implementation of this Amendment to the Knesset Committee of Foreign Affairs and Defense and the Committee for Advancement of the Status of Women and Gender Equality.
[40] Legal Aid Administration.
[41] While it is part of the MOJ, the LAA is independent and may file suits against the Government on behalf of its clients, who otherwise cannot afford legal representation.
[42] The largest Bedouin city in the south of Israel.

[42] Forwarding any such material is also deemed a sexual harassment offense.
[43] Authority for the Advancement of the Status of Women.
[44] Ministry of Religious Services.
[45] Ministry of Health.
[46] Ministry of Transport and Road Safety.
[47] High Court of Justice.
[48] One of the appellants had been ordered to give a Gett in 2011 and the other was ordered to do so in 2014. H.C.J. 5185/13 *Anonymous v. The Great Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem*, (28.02.2017).
[49] These sanctions included: preventing them from receiving passports and drivers' licenses, limiting their bank activities, instructing Israeli consulates abroad to refrain from assisting them, approving the publication of the appellants' photograph and details, public shaming (tagging them as "criminals") in the community, prohibiting the community from assisting them, visiting them in hospitals, seating them in synagogues, trading with them, showing them respect, and even performing a Jewish burial for one (1) of the appellants (when he ultimately passes).
[50] H.C.J. 5185/13 *Anonymous v. The Great Rabbinical Court in Jerusalem*, (28.02.2017).
[51] H.C.J 9261/16 *Anonymous and "Dead End" (Mavoy Satum) NGO v. The Great Rabbinical Court et al.*
[52] Reg.C.A 6897/14 *Radio Kol Berama v. "Kolech" - Religious Women's Forum* (9.12.2015).
[53] Cc 16-03-14588 *Rabinowitz vs. El Al Israel Airlines Ltd.*
[54] UPR Recommendation 136.56.
[55] Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and Social Services.
[56] Population and Immigration Authority.
[57] While the policy was not official before 2016, this shortened process was already implemented in individual cases as early as 2014.
[58] Ministry of Interior.
[59] National Labor Court NII Ap. 19745-05-15 *The National Insurance Institute v. Anonymous* (31.3.16).
[60] C.A 5116-11-12 *Yad HaShmona Guest House and Banquet Garden v. Yaacobovitch et. al.* (17.6.14).
[61] *Tel Aviv-Jaffa Family Matters Court, F.C. 57740-12-13 Anonymous et. al v. The Attorney General et. al.* (1.3.15). This is different from adoption proceedings which do require a social services review.
[62] S.Cr.C. 44503-08-15 *The State of Israel v. Yishay Shlisel* (19.4.2016, 26.6.2016).
[63] 533,500 USD.
[64] Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.
[65] Equal Rights Coalition.
[66] UPR Recommendations 136.27, 136.53, 136.57, 136.58, 136.63, 136.67, 136.85, 136.86, 136.90, 136.91, 136.92, 136.93, 136.94, 136.95, 136.96, 136.98, 136.100, 136.102, 136.103.
[67] As mentioned in the Gender-based equality section above, two of the Knesset Members belonging to the Arab minority are women.
[68] The number of Arab students obtaining degrees is increasing rapidly. During the academic year 2011-2012, 27,220 Arab students were enrolled in programs for a degree (and an additional 4,000 students were enrolled in an online university for a first and second degree), 22,000 of whom were studying for a first degree, 4,600 for a second degree, and 470 for a third degree. During the 2015-2016 academic year, 36,945 Arab students were enrolled in a degree program, 29,380 of whom were studying for a first degree, 6,645 for a second degree, and 625 for a third degree. It is also important to note that there has been a marked rise in the number of female Arab students receiving degrees. Female Arab students account for 66% of the Arab students studying for first degrees, a number significantly higher than the 52% female Jewish students studying for such degrees.
[69] Education facilities for children aged 0-3 are highly significant for the reintegration of women into the labor market. In 2014, the Ministry initiated a new method of resource allocation for the planning and building of daycare facilities, clearing hurdles for the construction of daycare centers in Arab localities. For example, certain Arab local authorities are now not required to match funding allocated by the authority, in order to rent land or facilities.
[70] These are employment guidance centers.
[71] As of May 2016, there were 21 such centers operating in Arab localities, providing vocational training and placement assistance. Since their establishment, these centers have served about 17,000 applicants (60% of whom are women), of which approximately 10,000 men and women were assisted in finding employment.

[73] 52 Million USD.
[74] 174.73 Million USD.
[75] Resolution No. 1052.
[76] 14.2 USD.
[77] 3.4 Million USD.
[78] 2.1 Million USD.
[79] 2.73 Million USD.
[80] 21 Million USD.
[81] 447.4 Million USD.
[82] Ministry of Education.
[83] Council for Higher Education.
[84] 1.7 Million USD.
[85] 135.13 Million USD.
[86] UPR Recommendations 136.43, 136.53, 136.58, 136.59, 136.61, 136.62, 136.65, 136.85.
[87] In 2015-6, 178 elementary schools and 189 middle and high schools (with 12,776 and 5,558 pupils respectively) took part in this program.
[88] H.C.J. 4797/07 *The Association for Civil Rights Israel v. Israeli Airport Authority et. al.* (10.3.15).
[89] *Rishon-Le'Zion Magistrate Court. C.s. 1230-07-13. Ayoub Abu-Sabit et. al. v. Israir Airlines and Tourism et. al.* (21.9.15). The Court further found that both respondents violated a statutory duty by not respecting the constitutional right to equality in providing a public service (Section 63 of *Torts Ordinance [New Version]* [5728-1968]) and the "duty of care" aspect of the *Tort Ordinance* and that the airline violated the principle of good faith while implementing a contract towards the plaintiffs (Section 39 of the *Contracts (General Part) Law* 5733-1973)).
[90] Plaintiff No. 1 was awarded 25,000 NIS (6,460 USD) and each of the four other plaintiffs were awarded 20,000 NIS (5,170 USD).
[91] L.D. 16211-11-14. (Nazareth Labor Court) *Mansur Mansur v. Electra Consumer Products Ltd.* (20.03.2016).
[92] 14,442 USD.
[93] 2,850 USD.
[94] 1300.
[95] Ministry of Immigration and Absorption.
[96] Prime Minister's Office.
[97] The senior officials included Deputy Director General or branch managers.
[98] See *Report of the Inter-ministerial Team to Eradicate Racism against Persons of Ethiopian Origin*, pp. 123-131 at http://www.justice.gov.il/Pubilcations/Articles/Documents/ReportEradicateRacism.pdf.
[99] The Government approved Resolution No. 609 in October 2015 and Resolution 1107 in February 2016.
[100] 130.2 Million USD.
[101] 12,800 USD.
[102] Em.D. 37213-08-13 *Ta'ava Trapya v. Deree Air-Conditioning LTD* (24.1.16).
[103] UPR Recommendations 136.87, 136.88, 136.89.
[104] This number is accurate as of January 2017.
[105] The Government, via the Administration for the Integration of PWD at the Workforce in the MOLSASS helps private sector employers fund such adjustments.
[106] The Expansion Order for Promoting Employment of Persons with Disabilities (PWD) which came into effect on October 5, 2014, defines "appropriate representation" in relation to private sector employers with over 100 employees as employing 3% of PWD in the workforce. Under the Order, employers are to appoint a designated employee to supervise the implementation of this provision of the *Equal Rights Law*. As far as the public sector is concerned, Amendment No. 15 to the *Equal Rights Law* which entered into force in January 2017, requires public sector employers with more than 100 employees whose workforce does not consist of at least 5% of persons with significant disabilities, to prepare and post an annual work program on their website, designed to promote the employment of persons with significant disabilities in the workforce including affirmative action and outreach measures, as detailed in the Amendment. The Commission for Equal Rights of PWD is authorized to issue affirmative action orders to public sector employers covered by the Amendment.

who do not comply with their obligations to prepare and post on their website or who do not implement their program. In addition, every public sector employer with 25 or more employees is obligated to appoint an Equality Officer, who is charged with promoting the employment of PWD in that workplace. Also, Amendment No. 34 to *the Government Companies Law*, 5735-1975, entered into force on December 22, 2016, and obligates government companies to have several population groups appropriately represented among its directors, including PWD. The Government Companies Authority publicized its goal to reach 3% representation for PWD among the directors of Government companies.

[107] 416,600 USD.

[108] UPR Recommendations 136.21, 136.57, 136.68, 136.69, 136.70, 136.71, 136.72, 136.74, 136.75, 136.76, 136.77, 136.96.

[109] This is also known as the freedom of conscience.

[110] *See* Noam (Dabul) Dvir *President Rivlin slams 'price tag' attack on mosque as terror*, YNet News (Oct. 14, 2014), available in http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4580600,00.html; Yoav Zitun, *Ya'alon: Price Tag is terror; perpetrators can expect zero tolerance*, YNet News (Aug. 1, 2014), available at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4474504,00.html; Ariel Ben Solomon, Lahav Harkov, *Netanyahu says 'Price Tag' attacks go against our values*, Jerusalem Post, (Apr. 30, 2014), available at http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Netanyahu-says-Price-Tag-attacks-go-against-our-values-350963.

[111] 414,300 USD.

[112] C.C. 29907-12-12, *Tzvi Ginsburg et. al. v. The Ministry of Religious Services* (4.9.14).

[113] For comparison purposes, there were 11 such cemeteries in 2013.

[114] C.Ap. 7918/15 *Anonymous v. Gal Friedman et. al.* (24.11.2015).

[115] Normally, on-call shifts may not be reported during holidays.

[116] UPR Recommendation 136.20, 136.67, 136.85.

[117] The human rights treaties relating to children include the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography.

[118] The only compulsory payment that may be charged is for personal accident insurance, and is limited to 34 NIS a year (10 USD). Voluntary payments may be collected for enrichment activities, but can be waived if a parent desires to do so.

[119] This expanded government support has thus far only been allocated for September until December 2017.

[120] The treatments include, among others, periodic examinations by a dentist, x-rays taken during the course of treatment, plaque removal, dental posts and reconstruction using amalgam and composite materials.

[121] National Insurance Institute.

[122] 14 USD.

[123] 14 USD.

[124] 69 USD.

[125] 69 USD.

[126] 138 USD.

[127] *See* Civil Service Bylaws Article 31.1 for more details.

[128] UPR Recommendation 136.55.

[129] For additional information see http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/system/index.html.

[130] Public Defender's Office.

[131] There is a distinction made between civil and family proceedings, whereby the eligibility for representation for matters pertaining to personal status are based on individual and not family income, thereby allowing single parents, for example, to receive LAA assistance.

[132] UPR Recommendation 136.53.

[133] 1200 USD.

[134] 1396 USD.

[135] In March 2015, the Presidium of Business Organizations and the General Federation of Labour added a fourth phase in which the minimum wage will be increased in December 2017 to 5300 NIS (1480 USD) but this agreement has yet to be ratified for implementation across the board.

[136] This agreement is also known as the Paris Climate Agreement.
[137] Israel submitted the NDC in September 2015 but according to the Agreement, a Party that submitted a plan in advance (under the Framework Convention), may adopt it as its NDC under the Paris Agreement.
[138] European Union.
[139] The Umbrella Group includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Russia, Japan, Norway, Ukraine, Iceland and the US.
[140] UN Environment.
[141] There is, however, a transition period of three years, so that some of the provisions do not take immediate effect.
[142] H.C.J. 1892/14 *The Association for Civil Rights in Israel et. al. v. The Minister of Public Security et. al.* (13.6.17)).
[143] The Court included Article 10(1) of the ICCPR, Article 16 of the CAT, and the Mandela Rules of 2015 in its decision.
[144] Government Resolution No. 1840 (11.8.2016). The Public Committee for the Examination of the Punishment and Treatment of Convicted Offenders committee was headed by former Supreme Court Justice Dalia Dorner and comprised of leading academic scholars and law enforcement personnel released a report with its recommendations in October 2015.
[145] *See* paragraph 73 above. According to the Government Resolution adopting these recommendations, there will be six Community Courts in Israel by October 2018.
[146] For example, in January 2016, NATU participated in a series of lectures and meetings in San Francisco which included meetings with state prosecutors, Members of Congress, the San Francisco City Council and with a coalition of non-governmental organizations operating against trafficking in persons. See http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2016/01/13/california-lawmakers-turn-to-israel-for-advice-on-stopping-human-trafficking-at-super-bowl-50/ for more information.
[147] Coordinated by the International Organization for Migration.
[148] Coordinated by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
[149] Israel's Agency for International Development Cooperation in the MFA.
[150] The Conference is entitled, "The Critical Role of the Judiciary in Combating Trafficking in Human Beings".
[151] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
[152] International Organization for Migration.
[153] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
[154] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
[155] National Anti-Trafficking Unit.
[156] Trafficking in Persons.
[157] *Ibrahim and Basma Julani v. The State of Israel (Cr. A. 6237/13).*
[158] *The State of Israel v. Alyssa Zamlan and Boris R...ien (S.Cr.C. 40993-07-16 Haifa District Court).*
[159] 1,330 USD.
[160] *The State of Israel v. Leonid Shtrumer and Assaf Ben-Ari (S.Cr.C. 24041-12-15, Tel Aviv District Court).*
[161] *The State of Israel v. Michael Ziess et. al. (Cr.C. 40524-11-16, Petach Tikva Magistrate Court).*
[162] Commonwealth of Independent States.
[163] *The State of Israel v. Mordechayeb et. al. (Cr C53927-12-16, Tel Aviv Magistrate Court).*
[164] Ministry of Public Security.
[165] 266,700 USD.
[166] *See* paragraph 87.
[167] The statement received UN symbol A/69/864.

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Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

I. Background

1. The present report was prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and 16/21, taking into consideration the periodicity of the universal periodic review. It is a compilation of information contained in reports of treaty bodies and special procedures and other relevant United Nations documents, presented in a summarized manner owing to word-limit constraints.

II. Scope of international obligations and cooperation with international human rights mechanisms and bodies

2. Israel was invited by several human rights bodies and mechanisms to become a party to the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, as well as seven optional protocols to human rights conventions to which it was a party, including the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.[1]

3. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, recommended that Israel urgently remove its reservations to articles 16 and 7 (b) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, relating to equality in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, and equality in political participation, respectively.[2]

4. In 2017, the Secretary-General noted that Israel had rejected the applicability of its human rights obligations outside its national territory, and recalled that the applicability of its human rights obligations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (i.e. the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip) had been continuously asserted in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, in reports of the Secretary-General and of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and by various human rights treaty bodies.[3] He also noted that the International Court of Justice had observed in 2004 that, because Israel exercised territorial jurisdiction over the Occupied Palestinian Territory, it was bound by human rights obligations in respect of the local population,[4] and that the Court had also observed that the obligations of Israel under the International Covenant on

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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights included "an obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those fields where competence has been transferred to Palestinian authorities".[7] He indicated that the accession by the State of Palestine to human rights treaties did not affect the obligations of Israel under international human rights law and international humanitarian law within the Occupied Palestinian Territory.[8]

5. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women recommended that Israel consider issuing a standing invitation to the special procedures of the Human Rights Council.[9]

6. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 indicated that the pattern of non-cooperation with the mandate was a serious concern.[10] The High Commissioner noted that, since 2008, Israel had refused to cooperate with and denied access to three successive mandate holders, stating its objections to the mandate, which it considered politically biased.[11]

7. In a resolution adopted on 23 July 2014, the Human Rights Council created an independent, international commission of inquiry to investigate violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, in the context of the military operations conducted before, during or after 13 June 2014.[12]

8. In its 2015 report, the international commission of inquiry regretted that Israel had not responded to its repeated requests for cooperation. It also indicated that the persistent lack of implementation of recommendations made by previous commissions of inquiry, treaty bodies, special procedures and other United Nations bodies were at the heart of the recurrence of violations in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory.[13] In 2017, pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 31/35, the High Commissioner presented a review on the status of implementation of recommendations formulated to improve the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory since 2009. The Government submitted a response.[14]

9. Israel contributed financially to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in 2013, including to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery.[15]

III. National human rights framework[16]

10. The Human Rights Committee reiterated its recommendation that Israel amend its Basic Law, which served as its bill of rights, to incorporate explicitly the principle of equality and non-discrimination.[17]

11. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women recommended that Israel amend the Basic Law to incorporate the principle of gender equality and non-discrimination in the public and private spheres.[18]

12. While noting a relevant recommendation from the previous review cycle,[19] the Committee against Torture recommended that Israel establish an independent national institution in full compliance with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles).[20]

IV. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

A. Cross-cutting issues

1. Equality and non-discrimination[21]

13. The Human Rights Committee, while noting that relevant legislation was under review, was concerned that the Jewish and non-Jewish population were treated differently in several regards and that, in its domestic legal framework, Israel maintained a three-tiered

system of laws affording different civil status, rights and legal protection for Jewish Israeli citizens, Palestinian citizens of Israel and Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem.[22] The Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories noted that Palestinians living in East Jerusalem in 1967 had been given permanent residency status, which could be revoked on a number of grounds, and that as many as 14,000 Palestinians had lost their status since 1967.[23] The Human Rights Committee indicated that Israel should ensure the equal treatment for all persons within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction, regardless of their national or ethnic origin.[24]

18. The Secretary-General noted that, in the West Bank, Israeli domestic law was applied extraterritorially to Israeli settlers, while Palestinians were subject to Israeli military law in addition to the Palestinian legal system. He indicated that the application of two different legal systems in the same territory on the sole basis of nationality or origin was inherently discriminatory.[25]

2. Development, the environment, and business and human rights[26]

19. The Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories indicated that the industrial, agricultural and natural resource sectors in the Occupied Palestinian Territory were shrinking steadily in economic significance and employment size, owing to, inter alia, Israeli restrictions on market access and the significant loss of arable land.[27]

20. The Secretary-General noted that the production of and trade in settlement goods raised concerns about the human rights impact on Palestinians caused and exacerbated by business enterprises, and highlighted the obligation of Israel to protect individuals and communities from adverse human rights impacts by third parties, such as business enterprises, operating in territory under its effective control.[28]

3. Human rights and counter-terrorism[29]

21. The Secretary-General noted that the Counter-Terrorism Law of 2016 had expanded the definition of a "terrorist entity" and of "support to a terrorist entity" and contained broad and ambiguous language concerning "incitement". He indicated that it also made permanent provisions that were being used as temporary measures, such as those that extended detention periods for security suspects without judicial review, the use of secret evidence and the exemption of the Internal Security Agency interrogations from being recorded.[30]

III. Civil and political rights

1. Right to life, liberty and security of person[31]

22. The Secretary-General noted that, during the escalation of hostilities in Gaza in 2014, 1,860 civilians, including 556 children, had been killed, and 82 hospitals and 295 schools had been either destroyed or damaged. In total, 90 Israelis, including 11 civilians, had been killed.[32] The independent commission of inquiry on the 2014 Gaza conflict stated that questions had arisen regarding the role of senior officials who had set military policy in several areas, such as in the attacks of the Israel Defense Forces on residential buildings and the use of artillery and other explosive weapons with wide-area effects in densely populated areas.[33]

23. OHCHR noted reports of the apparent excessive use of force and unlawful killings, including extrajudicial executions, by Israeli Security Forces, indicating that there had been a sharp increase in such reports after the escalation in violence in the West Bank that had begun in mid-September 2015, both in the context of clashes and in response to attacks or alleged attacks by Palestinians in which Israelis were killed or injured.[34] It was also concerned over the widespread use of live ammunition by the security forces, in particular against stone-throwers and in the context of demonstrations.[35]

24. OHCHR also noted that concerns had been raised regarding instances where the security forces had delayed the provision of medical assistance to wounded suspects, or had intentionally blocked Palestinian first responders and ambulances.[36]

21. The Committee against Torture indicated that Israel must make further efforts to effectively prevent and sanction incidents of excessive force, including by ensuring that the rules of engagement or regulations on opening fire were fully consistent with the Convention against Torture and other relevant international standards.[37]

22. OHCHR noted that Israeli law still did not include any specific prohibition, definition or criminalization of torture.[38] The Committee against Torture noted that a bill incorporating a separate offence of torture into Israeli law was in the process of being drafted. It called upon Israel to take the measures necessary to speed up that process and ensure that the definition of torture was in full conformity with the Convention against Torture.[39]

23. In 2017, the High Commissioner noted that an estimated 6,300 Palestinians were being held in Israeli prisons, mostly outside the Occupied Palestinian Territory.[40] OHCHR indicated that most Palestinian detainees continued to be held in Israel, in violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. It also raised concerns over continuing allegations of torture and ill-treatment of Palestinian detainees, largely during arrests, transfers and interrogation. It noted that, although the number of complaints of torture or ill-treatment involving the Israeli Security Agency had quadrupled since June 2013, not one complaint had led to a criminal investigation.[41]

24. The Committee against Torture was concerned that the necessity defence, which was contained in the Penal Law, had not been explicitly excluded for cases involving torture.[42] OHCHR indicated that, despite improvements, such as the creation of semi-independent accountability mechanisms, the necessity defence was still commonly invoked to prevent criminal investigations.[43] The Committee against Torture recommended that Israel remove necessity as a possible justification for torture.[44]

25. The Committee against Torture reiterated its previous concerns regarding administrative detention noting, inter alia, that pursuant to relevant legislation, detainees could be held in detention without charge indefinitely on the basis of secret evidence that was not made available to the detainee or his/her lawyer.[45] OHCHR indicated that the practice of administrative detention had significantly increased since 2014, with 750 Palestinians being held in July 2016, the highest number since early 2008.[46] The Committee against Torture recommended that Israel urgently take the measures necessary to end the practice of administrative detention and ensure that all persons in administrative detention were afforded all basic legal safeguards.[47]

26. The Committee against Torture indicated Israel should ensure that solitary confinement and equivalent measures were used only in exceptional circumstances and as a measure of last resort, and put an immediate end to and prohibit the use of such measures for juveniles and persons with psychosocial disabilities.[48]

27. In 2017, the High Commissioner expressed serious concern at reports of punitive measures against Palestinian detainees who had been participating in a mass hunger strike to demand, inter alia, an end to administrative detention and solitary confinement.[49] OHCHR indicated that, in response to a resurgence in hunger strikes, the Israeli Prisons Act had been amended in 2015 to allow judges to authorize force-feeding of detainees on hunger strike where necessary to prevent death.[50] The Committee against Torture recommended that Israel take the measures necessary to ensure that detainees engaging in hunger strikes were not subjected to feeding or other medical treatment against their will, as such practices might amount to torture or ill-treatment.[51]

28. OHCHR indicated that practices of collective punishment had significantly increased in the Occupied Palestinian Territory in recent years. It observed that family members of alleged attackers against Israelis faced a range of punitive measures, including demolitions of their homes — a practice that had resumed in mid-2014. In addition, since 2015, Israel had resumed the practice of withholding bodies of killed Palestinian attackers and alleged attackers. OHCHR highlighted that the unlawful closures and blockade of Gaza, which amounted to collective punishment, also continued to undermine the human rights of the residents.[52] The Committee against Torture was concerned at information regarding the postponement, on the basis of security concerns, of the return of the bodies of several Palestinians to their families. It recommended that Israel return them to their relatives as soon as possible so they could be buried in accordance with their traditions and religious

customs, and that Israel avoid similar situations in the future. It also recommended that Israel put an end to the policy of punitive house demolitions.[53]

2. Administration of justice, including impunity, and the rule of law[54]

29. The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories took note of concerns expressed by numerous civil society organizations about the justice system, and the dilemma they faced as to whether or not to approach the existing Israeli justice system, civil or military, for redress.[55]

30. In 2016, in an opinion on the situation of a Palestinian woman who had been prosecuted and tried before a military tribunal, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recalled that it had consistently held the view that, whatever the charges, civilians should never be tried by military courts.[56]

31. The High Commissioner noted the enduring climate of impunity for Israeli law enforcement personnel and a general lack of accountability.[57] OHCHR indicated that, despite a 2011 Israel Defense Forces policy requiring immediate investigation into every killing of a civilian, other than in combat situations, few incidents had led to a criminal investigation consistent with international standards.[58]

32. The Secretary-General was concerned that one of the elements driving impunity was that policies regulating the use of force were not aligned with international human rights law and standards. He noted similar concerns with regard to the rules of engagement of the Israel Defense Forces in the occupied West Bank and Gaza, which remained confidential.[59]

33. The Secretary-General reiterated concerns regarding the failure of Israel to enforce the law against violent settlers.[60] OHCHR indicated that, although there had been a significant decline in settler violence resulting in Palestinian casualties or damage to property over the previous three years, it was very rare that police complaints filed by Palestinians in the West Bank led to an investigation.[61]

34. While noting civilian oversight of the military justice system, the High Commissioner remarked that the accountability system remained limited for violations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory owing to reported shortcomings, including physical, financial, legal and procedural barriers that restricted the ability of Palestinians to gain access to justice.[62]

35. OHCHR indicated that, nearly three years since the escalation of hostilities in Gaza, serious concerns persisted concerning the lack of accountability regarding alleged violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of international human rights law. It observed that a high number of cases involving the Israel Defense Forces would not be subject to criminal investigation, owing to the decision by the Military Advocate-General to close those cases for lack of reasonable grounds for suspicion of criminal behaviour, despite serious allegations.[63] The Secretary-General noted that, when investigations were open, concern remained regarding whether they met human rights standards.[64] The Gaza Commission of Inquiry found that a necessary measure would include enhancing the independence and impartiality of the Military Advocate-General.[65]

3. Fundamental freedoms and the right to participate in public and political life[66]

36. OHCHR noted that limitations on access to religious sites, including the Al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem, had remained of concern.[67]

37. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) noted that defamation continued to be classified as a criminal offence under the Defamation Act and that the confidentiality of journalistic sources was not explicitly protected under Israeli law. It recommended that Israel decriminalize defamation and place it within the civil code in accordance with international standards.[68]

38. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders expressed serious concern at continued allegations that human rights defenders were being subjected to physical attacks, harassment, arrest, detention and death threats, particularly in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and urged the Government to ensure a protective environment where human rights defenders could work without unlawful restrictions and

fear of retaliatory acts.[57] The Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories recommended that Israel end the use of criminal, legal and security tools to obstruct the legitimate work of human rights defenders.[58]

39. In 2017, two special procedure mandate holders expressed concern about legislation debated or enacted that specifically targeted Israeli human rights defenders. They noted that a law passed in July 2016 required organizations that received more than half of their funding from foreign public sources, a large majority of which were human rights groups, to indicate such on all publications, stressing that it skewed public perception of human rights organizations.[59]

40. The Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories noted that, in March 2017, the Knesset had enacted legislation that would deny an entry visa or residency permit to any non-citizen if that person had worked for an organization that had issued a public call to boycott the State of Israel or had agreed to participate in such a boycott, including those that had focused their calls for a boycott only on the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.[60]

41. The Secretary-General noted that Palestinians' freedom of movement within the Occupied Palestinian Territory was significantly restricted by a complex and multilayered system of administrative, bureaucratic constraints.[61] OHCHR noted that the closures, checkpoints, limited access to natural resources and agricultural land, and other impediments to gaining access to basic services had directly affected the human rights of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians.[62] The Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories recommended that Israel ensure freedom of movement and the establishment of an equitable permit system for the residents of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.[63]

42. OHCHR noted that, in Gaza, the unlawful Israeli closure and blockade, and the restrictions by a neighbouring country at the Rafah crossing, had left 1.9 million Palestinians isolated.[64] The Human Rights Committee recommended that Israel lift its blockade of the Gaza Strip, insofar as it adversely affected the civilian population, and provide unrestricted access for the provision of urgent humanitarian assistance and materials needed for civilian reconstruction efforts.[65]

4. Prohibition of all forms of slavery

43. The Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended that Israel explicitly criminalize forced labour of children as a form of sale of children.[66]

44. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women noted a gap in protection and a lack of an adequate screening mechanism for the identification of victims of trafficking before they were detained.[67]

5. Right to privacy and family life[68]

45. The Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in practice noted information received indicating that, under the British Mandatory Law, which was still in force, all recognized religious communities in Israel had their own religious legal courts. It noted that the rabbinical courts, which adjudicated in accordance with religious Jewish law, discriminated against women in various ways. In particular, the refusal of a husband to divorce his wife deprived a woman of any way of obtaining a divorce and remarrying. It also observed that the sharia courts, which adjudicated in accordance with Muslim religious law, discriminated against women as regards ease of divorce for women as compared with men, including possible deprivation of the custody of children after widowhood or divorce if the woman remarried.[69] The Special Rapporteur on violence against women recommended that Israel harmonize its religious laws governing marriage and divorce with the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and eliminate its provisions that were discriminatory against women.[70]

C. Economic, social and cultural rights

1. Right to social security

46. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) indicated that most welfare services and benefits were not accessible to asylum seekers.[83]

47. OHCHR noted that, in 2015, the Knesset had passed a temporary order for three years allowing for revocation of national insurance entitlements for children convicted of "security-related" offences, including stone-throwing.[84]

2. Right to an adequate standard of living[85]

48. The Human Rights Committee expressed concern, inter alia, about the confiscation and expropriation of Palestinian land and continuing restrictions on the ability of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory to gain access to natural resources, including agricultural land and adequate water supply, as well as the continued construction of the wall in the West Bank and the limited allocation of permits for Palestinians to gain access to their agricultural lands situated on the other side. It noted with concern that those acts undermined the enjoyment of Palestinians of a wide range of their rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the right to self-determination.[86]

49. The Secretary-General indicated that the Israeli zoning and planning policy in the West Bank, in Area C, was restrictive and discriminatory, favouring settlement interests and making it practically impossible for Palestinians living in Area C to obtain building permits. He further recalled concerns regarding the discriminatory urban planning regime in East Jerusalem, and the limitations on Palestinian development in the city.[87] OHCHR indicated that Palestinians in Area C of the West Bank and East Jerusalem faced repeated demolitions and other pressures, which created a coercive environment, putting them at risk of forcible transfer. Demolitions had increased significantly in 2016.[88]

50. The Secretary-General stated that Israel must urgently cease discriminatory and unlawful planning processes in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, as they resulted in violations of Palestinians' rights, inter alia, to gain access to water and services, including health and education.[89] The Human Rights Committee indicated that Israel should refrain from implementing evictions and demolition orders based on discriminatory planning policies, laws and practices.[90]

51. The Secretary-General noted that Palestinian agricultural production had gone down from 50 per cent in 1968 to 4.9 per cent of gross domestic product in 2013.[91] The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development indicated that Israel had confiscated 82 per cent of Palestinian groundwater for use inside its borders or in its settlements, while Palestinians must import from Israel over 50 per cent of their water.[92] The Human Rights Council urged Israel to ensure that water resource allocation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was not discriminatory.[93]

52. In 2017, several special procedure mandate holders noted the implementation by Israel of a decision by the Palestinian Authority to further reduce electricity supply in Gaza, deepening the humanitarian crisis. The experts highlighted the precarious conditions of hospitals, the growth of water shortages, with drinkable water becoming less available while untreated sewage was being dumped into the Mediterranean, and noted that families were struggling to safely store food.[94]

3. Right to health[95]

53. UNHCR noted that asylum seekers were not covered by the 1994 National Health Insurance Law and had limited access to health insurance.[96]

54. OHCHR noted that the closure and restrictions imposed on Gaza had affected a wide range of human rights, particularly the right to health, due to chronic shortages of drugs and the lack of adequate medical care, especially following the escalation in 2014. It also noted that Gazans requiring specialist health care were dependent on a system of referrals outside Gaza, which required permits from the Israeli authorities.[97]

4. Right to education[98]

55. UNESCO noted that the vast majority of the recommendations[99] made during the previous review cycle in relation to education referred to measures supporting equal access to education, including for minority groups and communities. It reported that records of specific legal or policy action on that issue could not be identified. It indicated that Israel could be encouraged to take further steps towards improving equitable access to education and to adopt additional measures directed at fostering education opportunities for disadvantaged and marginalized groups.[100]

56. The Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories noted that schools in East Jerusalem had received significantly less funding than those in West Jerusalem, despite laws and High Court rulings aimed at preventing such discriminatory practices.[101]

D. Rights of specific persons or groups

1. Women[102]

57. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women indicated that patriarchal attitudes and gender stereotypes were deeply entrenched in society, and recommended that Israel put in place a comprehensive strategy targeted at women and men at all levels of society, including religious leaders, to eliminate stereotypes and patriarchal attitudes about the roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family and in society.[103]

58. The Special Rapporteur noted reports of domestic violence, indicating that the issue was seriously underreported owing to, among others, the perception that it was a private matter, particularly among women from the Jewish Orthodox, Palestinian, Bedouin and Druze communities, and a lack of trust in the authorities. She also noted reports of high rates of sexual violence, including rape, and that sexual harassment was still common.[104]

59. The Special Rapporteur recommended that Israel address underreporting and lack of investigation of cases of violence against women owing to social pressure and lack of trust in the police, that it ensure effective access to justice for all victims of gender-based violence under its jurisdiction or its effective control, and that it address the protection gap related to the absence of services for women and girls at risk of domestic violence within Arab communities.[105]

2. Children[106]

60. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) noted high rates of inequality of children in Israel, in a report in which it examined inequality in income, educational achievement, self-reported health and life satisfaction among children in developed countries.[107]

61. The Committee on the Rights of the Child was concerned that the provisions of the Protection of Children Law applied only to children under 14 years of age and recommended that Israel ensure the mandatory application of special protection measures in criminal proceedings to all child victims and witnesses up to the age of 18.[108]

62. The Secretary-General stated that the Israeli military law applicable in the West Bank that permitted the detention of Palestinian children from the age of 12 was at odds with the specific protection granted to children as members of a vulnerable group.[109]

63. OHCHR indicated that, in October 2015, the practice of holding children in administrative detention had resumed. It noted that instances of the practice, the first since December 2011, were part of an overall sharp increase in the detention of children following the escalation of violence in the West Bank in 2015. At the end of February 2016, 440 children had been detained, the highest number at any single time since 2008.[110]

64. OHCHR took note of other steps to penalize children in East Jerusalem. In 2015, the Knesset had amended the criminal law, increasing the maximum sentence for throwing stones or other objects at moving vehicles to 20 years' imprisonment when the intent to harm the occupants of the vehicle could be established, irrespective of harm caused, and 10 years when the intent could not be proved.[111]

65. The Human Rights Committee remained concerned that positive reforms in the administration of juvenile military justice, including the increase in the age of majority in the military courts from 16 to 18 years and the adoption of a number of military orders providing safeguards for children, appeared not to be implemented effectively in practice, and that Palestinian children were still exposed to arbitrary arrest and detention and often did not enjoy full procedural rights.[112]

3. Minorities and indigenous peoples[113]

66. The Special Rapporteur on violence against women noted that Jews comprised about 75.5 per cent of the population, and Arabs about 20.2 per cent. There were also over 250,000 Bedouins living in Israel.[114] The Human Rights Committee was concerned that, despite the steps taken, Israeli citizens of Arab origin continued to be underrepresented in the civil service, in particular in decision-making positions.[115]

67. The Committee was concerned at demolitions, forced evictions and displacement of Bedouin citizens of Israel living in the Negev desert and at the restricted access of Bedouins living in unrecognized and recently recognized villages in the Negev to basic services, including adequate housing, water and sanitation, health care, education and public transportation. It indicated that Israel should ensure the participation of Bedouins in the Negev in any process concerning their relocation and that any proposed relocation plan took due account of their traditional way of life and was carried out in accordance with relevant international standards.[116]

68. OHCHR noted that 1,596 Palestinians, mostly vulnerable Palestinian Bedouin and herding communities, had been forcibly evicted in 2016.[117] The Secretary-General reiterated that the planned relocation of the Bedouin and herder communities in Area C had given rise to concerns of forcible transfer.[118]

4. Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers[119]

69. The Committee on the Rights of the Child was concerned at the lack of birth certificates in particular for migrant, asylum-seeking and refugee children and recommended that Israel urgently take measures to ensure that all children within its territory had access to birth certificates.[120]

70. UNHCR expressed appreciation that the scope of the Anti-Infiltration Law was less restrictive than the 2012 version of the Law. It noted, however, that despite improvements the law provided for the automatic detention of persons considered as "infiltrators", without an individual assessment of the necessity to detain. Although the law did not prohibit the detention of children, unaccompanied minors and persons whose health could be at risk if detained were exempt. It recommended that Israel amend the Law to prohibit the detention of children and provide access to legal advice for detained persons, and ensure that detention was only used as a last resort and only after assessing the individual's particular circumstances.[121]

71. UNHCR noted that Israel did not provide information regarding the asylum proceedings to persons who might be in need of international protection, including at the borders. It also noted that assistance, legal or otherwise, was not provided and that the asylum system was struggling to handle large numbers of applications. It highlighted the situation of persons originating from certain third countries, indicating that, in the case of persons from a certain country, Israel had refrained from adopting a protection policy, and that, regarding persons from another country, it had taken the position, contrary to that of UNHCR, that their situation did not give rise to refugee status under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.[122]

72. UNHCR recommended that Israel simplify the asylum procedure, provide linguistic and legal assistance throughout all stages of the asylum procedure and develop alternative processing structures, such as prima facie recognition, for categories of asylum seekers that were likely at risk.[123]

5. Stateless persons[124]

73. UNHCR indicated that protection of stateless persons was limited, as the 2012 Procedure for Dealing with a Foreign Subject Claiming to be Stateless excluded from its

application individuals who entered Israel irregularly, rendering the procedure irrelevant to most stateless persons in the country. It recommended that Israel amend the Procedure in order to determine the status and provide protection to stateless persons in line with the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.[125]

E. Specific regions or territories[126]

74. OHCHR stated that settlement expansion continued, as did the retroactive legalization of settlement outposts, which were often closely linked with settler violence.[127] The Secretary-General indicated that the settler population in Area C and East Jerusalem had doubled since the Oslo Accords, reaching over 594,000 people (including an estimated 208,000 in East Jerusalem) by the end of 2015, and noted that the number was expected to rise further. He also indicated that settlement expansion and land appropriation by the Government in the occupied Syrian Golan had continued, and that in October 2016 it had reportedly approved the construction of 1,600 new homes in the illegal settlement of Katzrin.[128]

75. The Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories noted that, in February 2017, the Knesset had passed legislation legalizing the confiscation of private Palestinian land. New legislation had sought to legalize some 3,000 housing units built on private Palestinian land in the West Bank. He recommended that Israel repeal its legislation confiscating Palestinian lands.[129]

76. The Security Council condemned all measures aimed at altering the demographic composition, character and status of the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, including, inter alia, the construction and expansion of settlements, transfer of Israeli settlers, confiscation of land, demolition of homes and displacement of Palestinian civilians.[130]

77. The Human Rights Council called upon Israel to accept the de jure applicability of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and to the occupied Syrian Golan.[131]

Notes

[1] Tables containing information on the scope of international obligations and cooperation with international human rights mechanisms and bodies for Israel are available at www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/MENARegion/Pages/ILIndex.aspx.

[2] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.1-136.16, 136.29-136.52, 136.160, 136.166,136.188, 136.195-136.199, 136.201 and 136.236-136.237.

[3] See CAT/C/ISR/CO/5, paras. 53-54; CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, paras. 5(d) and 5(e); and A/HRC/29/52, para.86 (e). See also the report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, on her mission to Israel and A/HRC/35/30/Add.5.

[4] See the report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, on her mission to Israel. See also A/HRC/35/30/Add.5.

[5] See A/HRC/34/38, para. 7.

[6] See *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004*, paras. 110-113.

[7] Ibid., para. 112.

[8] See A/HRC/34/38, para. 8. See also A/HRC/28/44, para. 6.

[9] See the report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, on her mission to Israel. See also A/HRC/35/30/Add.5.

[10] See A/71/554, para. 2. See also A/HRC/34/70, para. 2.

[11] See A/HRC/35/19, para. 55. See also A/HRC/35/G/5.

[12] See A/HRC/29/52, para. 1.

[13] Ibid., paras. 3 and 82.

[14] See A/HRC/35/19, paras. 1-3. See also A/HRC/35/G/5.

[15] OHCHR, "Funding", in *OHCHR Report 2013*, pp. 131, 139 and 169.

[16] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.17-136.20, 136.25-136.26, 136.28, 136.47-136.49, 136.54, 136.107-136.108, 136.148, 136.152-136.154, 136.157-136.158, 136.161-

136.164, 136.167, 136.194, 136.200, 136.202-136.204, 136.206-136.207, 136.218-136.219, 136.221-136.225, 137.2 and 137.5-137.7.

[17] See CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 7.

[18] See the report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, on her mission to Israel. See also A/HRC/35/30/Add.5.

[19] For the relevant recommendation, see A/HRC/25/15, para. 136.25 (Nigeria) (Poland) (Uruguay) (South Sudan).

[20] See CAT/C/ISR/CO/5, para. 10.

[21] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.17-136.21, 136.27, 136.53-136.63, 136.107, 136.110, 136.146, 136.203 and 137.2.

[22] See CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 7.

[23] See A/HRC/34/70, para. 14.

[24] See CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 7.

[25] See A/HRC/34/38, paras. 39-40.

[26] For the relevant recommendation, see A/HRC/25/15, para. 136.234.

[27] See A/71/554, para. 43(d).

[28] See A/HRC/34/39, para. 34. See also Human Rights Council resolution 34/31.

[29] For the relevant recommendation, see A/HRC/25/15, para. 136.133.

[30] See A/71/364, para. 67.

[31] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.22, 136.111, 136.113-136.135 and 136.192.

[32] See A/HRC/34/38, para. 41. See also press release dated 3 March 2017, available from www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15118&LangID=E.

[33] See A/HRC/29/52, para. 77.

[34] OHCHR submission for the universal periodic review of Israel, p. 1. See also A/HRC/28/80, paras. 15-17, A/HRC/31/40, paras. 10-28, A/71/364, paras. 8-15, A/HRC/34/36, paras. 7-17, and A/HRC/34/38, paras. 45-48.

[35] OHCHR submission, p. 1. See also A/HRC/31/40, paras. 20 and 23, and A/71/364, para. 12.

[36] OHCHR submission, p. 1. See also A/HRC/31/40, para. 16, and A/71/364, paras. 10-11.

[37] See CAT/C/ISR/CO/5, paras. 32-33. See also CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 13.

[38] OHCHR submission, p. 3.

[39] See CAT/C/ISR/CO/5, paras. 12-13.

[40] See press release dated 24 May 2017, available from www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21659.

[41] OHCHR submission, p. 3. See also A/HRC/31/40, para. 47, A/HRC/34/38, paras. 49-50, and A/71/364, paras. 58-60.

[42] See CAT/C/ISR/CO/5, para. 14.

[43] OHCHR submission, p. 3.

[44] See CAT/C/ISR/CO/5, para. 15.

[45] Ibid., para. 22.

[46] OHCHR submission, p. 3. See also A/HRC/34/38, para. 53.

[47] See CAT/C/ISR/CO/5, para. 23.

[48] Ibid., para. 25.

[49] See press release dated 24 May 2017, available from www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21659.

[50] OHCHR submission, p. 3.

[51] See CAT/C/ISR/CO/5, para. 27.

[52] OHCHR submission, pp. 2-3. See also A/71/352, para. 46-51, and A/HRC/34/36, para. 36.

[53] See CAT/C/ISR/CO/5, paras. 40-43. See also CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 9.

[54] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.65-136.66, 136.134-136.138 and 136.208-136.210.

[55] See A/71/352, para. 52.

[56] See A/HRC/WGAD/2016/15, para. 25.

[57] See A/HRC/34/36, para. 3. See also A/HRC/35/19, A/HRC/35/G/5, and A/HRC/29/52, para. 76.

[58] OHCHR submission, p. 6. See also A/71/364, para. 42.

[59] See A/71/364, para. 47.

[60] See A/71/355, para. 19. See also A/HRC/34/38, para. 34.

[61] OHCHR submission, p. 7. See also A/HRC/34/39, para. 19.

[62] See A/HRC/35/19, paras. 17-18. See also A/HRC/35/G/5.

[63] OHCHR submission, pp. 6-7. See also A/HRC/34/36, paras. 45-46.

[64] See A/HRC/34/38, para. 42.

[65] See A/HRC/29/52, para. 72.

[66] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.21, 136.67-136.77, 136.79-136.80, 136.109, 136.142-136.144, 136.148-136.151, 136.162, 136.169, 136.176, 136.178, 136.181, 136.211-136.218, 137.1 and 137.3.
[67] See A/HRC/35/19, para. 47. See also A/HRC/35/G/5, and A/71/355, para. 29.
[68] See UNESCO submission for the universal periodic review of Israel, paras. 5 and 11.
[69] See A/HRC/34/52/Add.1, paras. 691-694.
[70] See A/HRC/34/70, para. 66 (b).
[71] See press release dated 3 March 2017, available from www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21279&LangID=E. See also A/HRC/34/70, paras. 54-57.
[72] See A/HRC/34/70, para. 60.
[73] See A/HRC/34/38, para. 62. See also A/HRC/34/39, para. 54-55.
[74] OHCHR submission, p. 5.
[75] See A/HRC/34/70, para. 65(f).
[76] OHCHR submission, pp. 5-6. See also A/HRC/34/38, para. 30 and A/71/364, para. 28.
[77] See CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 12.
[78] See CRC/C/OPSC/ISR/CO/1, para. 27.
[79] See the report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, on her mission to Israel.
[80] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.23-136.24 and 136.56.
[81] See A/HRC/31/79, case No. ISR 5/2015, p. 61.
[82] See the report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, on her mission to Israel. See also A/HRC/35/30/Add.5.
[83] UNHCR submission for the universal periodic review of Israel, p. 3.
[84] OHCHR submission, p. 4.
[85] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.109, 136.145, 136.165, 136.226-136.229 and 136.234-136.235.
[86] See CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 17. See also OHCHR submission, p. 4. See also A/HRC/34/38, para. 20.
[87] See A/HRC/31/43, paras. 18 and 45. See also A/71/554, para. 53.
[88] OHCHR submission, p. 4. See also A/HRC/34/38, para. 29.
[89] See A/HRC/31/43, para. 69.
[90] See CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 9.
[91] See A/HRC/28/44, para. 30.
[92] See TD/B/63/3 and Corr.1, para. 34.
[93] Human Rights Council resolution 34/30.
[94] See press release dated 12 July 2017, available from www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21866.
[95] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.83-136.84.
[96] UNHCR submission, p. 3.
[97] OHCHR submission, p. 6.
[98] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.53, 136.67, 136.85-136.86, 136.91, 136.93, 136.98 and 136.102-136.103.
[99] Ibid., paras. 136.53, 136.67, 136.85-136.86, 136.91, 136.93, 136.98 and 136.102-136.103.
[100] See UNESCO submission, para. 10.
[101] See A/HRC/34/70, para. 17.
[102] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.19, 136.21, 136.60, 136.64 and 136.81.
[103] See the report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, on her mission to Israel. See also A/HRC/35/30/Add.5.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid.
[106] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.110, 136.112-136.114, 136.116, 136.123, 136.126-136.129, 134.134, 136.126-136.141, 136.159, 136.194, 136.208, 137.2 and 137.4.
[107] See UNICEF, *Innocenti Report Card 13, Fairness for Children: A league table of inequality in child well-being in rich countries* (Florence, Italy, April 2016), pp. 4-6, 8 and 10. See also press release entitled "New figures on growing inequality among children in high-income countries", available from www.unicef.org/media/media_90862.html.
[108] See CRC/C/OPSC/ISR/CO/1, paras. 34 and 35 (a) and (b).
[109] See A/HRC/34/38, para. 59.
[110] OHCHR submission, p. 3. See also A/HRC/31/40, para. 41.
[111] Ibid., p. 4. See also A/HRC/31/40, paras. 49-50.
[112] See CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 19.
[113] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.90-136.103.

[114] See the report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, on her mission to Israel. See also A/HRC/35/30/Add.5.
[115] See CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 8.
[116] See CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 9.
[117] OHCHR submission, p. 5. See also A/HRC/34/38, para. 25; and CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4, para. 9.
[118] See A/HRC/31/43, para. 49.
[119] For relevant recommendations, see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.104-136.106, 136.147, 136.155-136.156 and 136.231-136.233.
[120] See CRC/C/OPSC/ISR/CO/1, paras. 24-25.
[121] UNHCR submission, pp. 1 and 3.
[122] Ibid., p. 2.
[123] Ibid.
[124] For the relevant recommendation, see A/HRC/25/15, para. 136.16.
[125] UNHCR submission, p. 5.
[126] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.13, 136.47-136.49, 136.78, 136.107-136.108, 136.148-136.154, 136.161-136.167, 136.168, 136-191, 136.202, 136.214-136.219, 136.221-136.225, 136.230, 137.5 and 137.7.
[127] OHCHR submission, p. 7. See also A/HRC/31/43, para. 25; and A/71/355, para. 11.
[128] See A/HRC/34/39, paras. 11 and 58.
[129] See A/HRC/34/70, paras. 11 and 65 (a).
[130] See Security Council resolution 2334 (2016).
[131] Human Rights Council resolution 34/31. See also General Assembly resolutions 71/96 and 71/97.

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Summary of Stakeholders' submissions on Israel*

Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

I. Background

1. The present report was prepared pursuant to Human Rights Council resolutions 5/1 and 16/21, taking into consideration the periodicity of the universal periodic review. It is a summary of 31 stakeholders' submissions[1] to the universal periodic review, presented in a summarized manner owing to word-limit constraints.

II. Information provided by stakeholders

A. Scope of international obligations and cooperation with international human rights mechanisms and bodies[2]

2. Alkarama noted that Israel had not ratified the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It had also never accepted the individual complaints procedures under the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and article 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Israel had not ratified Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute.[3]

3. JS8 stated that Israel should extend a standing invitation to all United Nations Special Procedure mandate holders and prioritise an official visit of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967.[4]

4. JS1 recalled that Israel continued to refuse to recognize the applicability of its international obligations, deriving from treaties that Israel is party to, to the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT).[5] JS5 highlighted that Israel refused cooperation with some human rights bodies.[6] GIC noted that Israel continued to refuse to abide by its international obligations, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention.[7]

* The present document was not edited before being sent to United Nations translation services.

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II. National human rights framework[1]

5. JS1 indicated that although the recommendation on the establishment of a national human rights institution in accordance with the Paris Principles was common in both cycles of the UPR, Israel did not implement.[2]

III. Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law

A. Cross cutting issues

Equality and non-discrimination[3]

6. EAFORD stated that Israel's Basic Laws still did not explicitly guarantee equality and the prohibition of discrimination.[4] JS1 indicated that in 2016 the Knesset voted against a draft bill that aimed to stipulate the inclusion of an equality clause in Israel's Basic Law.[5] Mecinaj recalled that States recommended that Israel revise its discriminatory laws and enshrine the right to equality for all citizens, but none of the recommendations had been implemented.[6]

7. Adalah noted that while it was a positive step to accept recommendations 136.98, 136.96 and 136.95[7], Israel had enacted more laws that further discriminated against the rights of Palestinian citizens such as, the "Expulsion of Members of Knesset" Law (2016); the Anti-Terror Law (2016); and the "Kaminitz" Law (2017).[8]

8. GBC highlighted that Palestinian citizens of Israel continued to face discrimination in, *inter alia*, access to justice, housing rights, employment, education, health care, and participation in political and public affairs.[9] EAFORD indicated that Ethiopian and Arab Jews inside Israel also experienced institutionalized racism.[10]

9. JS6 stated that LGBTI people in Israel experienced disproportionally high rates of structural, institutional and interpersonal discrimination and violence, and noted that LGBTI-phobia was present in all circles of life, particularly in the public sphere, the education system, the army, and health services.[11]

Development, the environment, and business and human rights[12]

10. EAFORD indicated that contrary to UPR recommendations and UN resolutions reaffirming Palestinian sovereignty over their natural resources, including land, water and energy resources, Israel continued to violate their right to access and freely exploit their natural wealth and resources. Israel obstructed the implementation of reconstruction, development and restricted the maintenance of vital infrastructure, notably by refusing to issue building permits in Area C.[13]

11. EAFORD stated that Israel's depletion and overexploitation of natural resources and the dumping of garbage and untreated water was extremely detrimental to the environment. It noted that the Palestinian economy and Palestinians' socioeconomic rights have sustained tremendous damage due to this.[14]

Human rights and counter-terrorism

12. JS1 noted that the Anti-Terror Law (2016) substantially expanded the scope of the Israeli penal law by incorporating severe provisions of the British Mandatory Defense Emergency Regulations 1945.[15] The law contains broad and vague definitions of 'terrorism' and 'terrorist organizations', which may be exploited by the security services and state authorities, particularly against Palestinians in Israel and/or against political activists.[16]

13. Adalah highlighted that the Anti-Terror Law established new criminal offenses such as public expressions of "support" or "empathy" for terror organizations, and significantly increased the maximum sentences for such offenses. The new law was expected to significantly harm the rights of Palestinians detained, by allowing the use of "secret

evidence".[7] Mezzeh stated that Palestinian citizens were the primary targets of these measures.[8]

2. [illegible]

Right to life, liberty and security of person

14. AI noted that Israeli forces had continued to regularly use reckless and unlawful lethal force against Palestinians, often in the context of Palestinian protests against the Israeli occupation. Between 22 September 2015 and 6 September 2016, AI reported on 20 cases of unlawful killings of Palestinians, including 15 cases in which Palestinians who were not posing an imminent threat to life were deliberately shot dead by Israeli forces.[9] JS7 stated that there had been an increase in extrajudicial killings of Palestinians since 2015 under security protests. Israel then withheld the bodies and only released them to families under certain conditions on their release, including immediate burial.[10]

15. LAWGD noted that Israel continued to violate Palestinians' right to life and security of person, particularly through the use of excessive and often lethal force and the failure to hold perpetrators accountable.[11] HRW stated that in policing situations in the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli security forces repeatedly used excessive force.[12] JS8 noted that on 22 May 2017, protests in the cities of Hebron and Ramallah in the West Bank were violently repressed.[13] JS1 raised the issue of different arbitrary police practices against women protestors.[14]

16. Mezzeh noted that the persistent failure of accountability made possible the continuance of a culture of police violence, where the Israeli Police Investigation Department was thoroughly biased and there was no political pressure to punish Israeli police homicide.[15] Alkarama stated that new regulations passed in 2015 on violent riots allowed opening fire with live ammunitions as an initial option on those throwing stones or firebombs.[16]

17. AI noted that Israel partially accepted recommendations to incorporate the Convention against Torture into domestic law and to prosecute those suspected of committing acts of torture. At the same time, it noted that Israeli forces had continued to torture and ill-treat Palestinian detainees with impunity; and, while a bill criminalizing torture was being drafted by the Ministry of Justice, Israeli law continued to lack the offence of torture based on the definition in Article 1 of CAT.[17]

18. Addameer stated that Palestinian prisoners were often subjected to both psychological and physical torture during interrogation, and described the different forms of torture and ill-treatment employed against Palestinian prisoners.[18] PHR1 received daily complaints from prisoners and detainees held in conditions of solitary confinement.[19] Alkarama noted that confessions, redacted in Hebrew and signed under coercion by Palestinian suspects, were relied upon as the main piece of evidence in Israeli military courts.[20]

19. AI noted that Israel accepted or partially accepted recommendations to minimize its use of administrative detention, however, the authorities continued to use administrative detention. AI stressed that administrative detention orders can be renewed indefinitely and considered that some Palestinians held in administrative detention were prisoners of conscience.[21] Addameer reported that as of May 2017, there were approximately 490 Palestinian administrative detainees held in Israeli prisons, without any charges or any trial procedures. Administrative detention in the OPT was ordered by a military commander and grounded on "security" reasons.[22]

20. ELD noted that in many cases, reasons for the detention were classified and judges refused to reveal the incriminating evidence to the detainees' lawyers.[23] JS3 referred to the discriminatory "Facebook arrests" of Palestinians for alleged incitement to violence or racism in social media.[24] JS8 added that a significant portion of those arrested had been placed under administrative detention.[25]

21. ADF3 reported that the conditions of imprisonment of Palestinians remained abhorrent, marked by the denial of family visits, solitary confinement, overcrowding, poor

hygiene, lack of basic amenities, the denial of access to education, and lack of medical care.[45] Addameer noted that Palestinian prisoners were held across 17 prisons and four interrogation and detention centers inside Israeli territory, and that only one of the prisons was located inside the occupied territory, in contravention of the Fourth Geneva Convention.[46]

22. Addameer reported that since 2013, several Palestinian prisoners and detainees embarked on individual hunger strikes. On 17 April 2017, Palestinian Prisoners' Day, an estimated 1500 Palestinian political prisoners and detainees held in Israeli prisons declared the beginning of an open hunger strike.[47] Adalah noted that they protested against the inhumane conditions of their detention in Israeli prisons.[48] PHRI noted that the Force Feeding law passed in 2015 by the Knesset, authorized a district court to permit the administration of forced medical treatment—including force feeding—to a hunger-striking prisoner.[49]

Administration of justice, including impunity and the rule of law[50]

23. Addameer stated that the right to trial without undue delay for Palestinians in the Israeli military court system was hindered by both legal and practical impediments. The maximum periods of detention for Palestinians detained from initial detention until the conclusion of a trial by military court were significantly longer at each stage of proceedings as compared to those prescribed for the detention of Israelis under the civil court system.[51]

24. HRA-NGO highlighted the serious deterioration in integrity of law and justice agencies as a consequence of the implementation of e-government systems. It affirmed that the validity and integrity of any legal and judicial records of Israel should be deemed dubious at best.[52]

25. AI noted that attacks by settlers against Palestinians had also continued, including harassment, damage to property or physical violence. Notwithstanding a small number of exceptional prosecutions, Israeli investigations into these violations had fallen far short of international standards and in the majority of cases Israeli forces and settlers had not been held accountable despite strong evidence that a crime had taken place.[53]

Fundamental freedoms and the right to participate in public and political life[54]

26. JS5 noted that access to the Al Aqsa Mosque was severely restricted by the ongoing closure of Jerusalem to residents of the West Bank and Gaza and by the regular ban on Palestinian men under the age of 50 from entering the Mosque. Israeli authorities continued to interfere with the internal affairs of Al Aqsa.[55] ODVV noted a policy to turn the mosque into a synagogue.[56]

27. ADF International stated that the Messianic Jewish community reported hostility and discrimination against them in social life, with occasional violence. Arabic-speaking Christians had also accused Israel of discrimination.[57]

28. JS8 stated that Israel continued to restrict freedom of expression, and that the so-called Facebook Bill (Removal of Criminally Offensive Content from the Internet Bill) had passed its first reading in the Knesset.[58]

29. AI noted that while Israel accepted a recommendation to ensure that human rights defenders were able to carry out their legitimate work, the government had increased acts of intimidation and smear campaigns against both Palestinian and Israeli HRDs.[59] JS3 referred to smear campaigns against women human rights defenders in Israel.[60] JS2 raised concerns about other forms of violations against Palestinian women human rights defenders and journalists.[61] 30. FLD reported that HRDs in Palestine were regularly targeted by Israeli forces, in an attempt to deter them from their legitimate work to document Israeli violations.[62] JS8 stated that civil society organisations were subjected to harassment and targeted surveillance.[63]

30. JS3 reported that senior members of the government, including the Prime Minister had launched attacks against NGOs, and also publicly called on European states to stop their funding of the Israeli NGO "Breaking the Silence".[64]

31. JS3 reported on the NGO Foreign Funding Transparency Law (2016) that limited the operation and financing of human rights organizations, requiring NGOs registered in Israel that receive more than 50% of their annual budget from foreign governments to declare their sources of funding in all publications, letters and reports.[65] JS8 added that the law included very high fines.[66] Similar concerns were raised by Alkarama[67], HRW[68] and FLD.[69]

32. JS3 described illegal police practices to suppress protests in Israel, including the refusal of authorization for protests.[70] Adalah referred to the "Expulsion of Members of Knesset" Law (2016), as an attempt to delegitimize the elected representatives of the Palestinian minority.[71]

33. HRW noted that Israeli restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank included checkpoints, both within the West Bank and on the Green Line, and the separation barrier slicing through the West Bank, contrary to international humanitarian law.[72] AI noted that these restrictions amounted to collective punishment limiting Palestinians' ability to work and to access healthcare, education and family members.[73]

Right to privacy and family life[74]

34. AccessNow reported that Israeli companies produced surveillance technology that governments around the world deployed to unlawfully interfere with the privacy and freedom of expression of human rights defenders. It noted inadequate oversight of the human rights-infringing activity of Israeli surveillance companies.[75]

35. ADF International indicated that marriage in Israel was conducted on a confessional basis, and must be performed by a registered religious group in order to be valid. it noted that it was not possible to enter into an interfaith or non-religious marriage. In order for interfaith marriages or marriages conducted by a non-religious or an unregistered religious authority to be recognised in Israel, a couple must marry abroad and return to have their marriage inscribed with the civil authorities.[76]

36. JS7 noted that Israel had severely restricted family unification and the registration of children born from a parent holding a West Bank ID and another from occupied East Jerusalem. It noted that the new Israeli law related to health insurance, adopted in 2016 also discriminated against Palestinians living in Jerusalem through family unification in terms of accessibility.[77]

37. JS6 indicated that under Israeli law, the adoption process for a child who is not a biological child of one of the parents was available only to heterosexual couples. JS6 also noted that same-sex male couples interested in giving birth to their own biological child via surrogate motherhood needed a surrogate mother, and the surrogacy law permitted access to surrogacy only to heterosexual married individuals.[78]

38. JS6 indicated that the Israeli regulations on changing the sex designation clause in the public registry ("State IDs") raised procedural obstacles and denied transgender people the right to recognition of their gender identity. Changing the sex designation clause was conditioned on undergoing sex reassignment surgery, but new regulations added another path conditioned on the approval of a Public Committee appointed by the Ministry of Health. JS6 noted with concern some preconditions for the approval.[79]

3. Economic, social and cultural rights

Right to work and to just and favourable conditions of work[80]

39. LAFORD indicated discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel in the job market was reflected in income disparity and relegation to low-income and semi-skilled positions.[81]

40. JS1 noted that restrictions on movement, work permits and unequal and discriminatory policies undertaken by the occupying forces in the OPT, hindered the right to work of the Palestinians. Unemployment was rising, standing at 26% in 2015, and informal labor encompassed 59.9% of the total number of workers in the West Bank and the Gaza strip.[82]

Right to social security

41. JS7 stated that Israel had revoked health and social security entitlements as punishment to family members of alleged Palestinians attackers, noting these policies had disastrous consequences on the lives of Palestinians, especially women and children.[97]

Right to an adequate standard of living[98]

42. LAFORD noted that Israel deprived Palestinians of the right to an adequate standard of living and that its actions imperiled livelihoods, heightened poverty and food insecurity, denied Palestinians social services, restricted access to quality medical care and had hurled Gaza into an entrenched humanitarian crisis.[99]

43. Adalah stated that in April 2017, the Knesset enacted an amendment to the Planning and Building Law, known as the "Kaminitz Law", increasing the enforcement and penalization of planning and building offenses, adding this will have a disparate impact on Palestinian citizens after decades of discrimination in land allocation, which had resulted in a severe housing crisis in Arab towns throughout Israel.[100] Meezan stated that this law increased the administrative powers of governmental authorities to implement demolition and eviction orders.[101]

44. JS5 noted that Israel had continued to implement discriminatory urban planning policy in order to change the legal status, the geographic character and the demographic composition of the whole of Jerusalem in favour of the Jewish majority. It added that Israel's policies on Jerusalem promoted a united Jewish capital, implemented through urban planning to quietly deport the Palestinian population out of the city.[102] Al-Haq noted that only 13% of land in East Jerusalem had been zoned for Palestinian construction, while 35% had been confiscated for Israeli settlement use.[103] AI indicated that building permits were very rarely issued to Palestinians in East Jerusalem.[104]

45. JS5 stated that from 2004 to 2016, 685 structures were destroyed in East Jerusalem, displacing 2,513 Palestinians due to lack of permits.[105] Alkarama noted that Palestinians' houses were demolished because they were constructed without the required permits, which are denied in more than 94% of Palestinian applications.[106] JS5 noted that 85,000 Palestinians were at risk of home demolition.[107] HRW noted that Israel had also punitively demolished the homes of families of Palestinians suspected of attacking Israelis.[108]

46. JS2 highlighted that housing demolition and property destruction remained an overshadowing fear for many women living in occupied East Jerusalem.[109]

47. JS7 stated that since October 2015, Israel had gravely escalated the use of collective punishment as a tool of forcible transfer and displacement of Palestinians from occupied East Jerusalem. It added that these punishment policies included house demolitions, residency revocations, closures and other movement restrictions. In January 2017, a bill was reintroduced in the Knesset to grant the Ministry of Interior power to revoke the permanent residency of persons who committed or are suspected of having committed an attack against Israel, as well as their family members.[110]

Right to health[111]

48. PHRI noted that one of the most critical human rights issues facing Palestinians in the OPT was the restrictions placed on freedom of movement and the denial of the right to health. Palestinians cannot transfer to an external medical institution without receiving a medical referral and a financial coverage from the Palestinian Ministry of Health. Palestinian patients then had to receive a timely permit to enter or cross Israel on their way from the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories and Israeli Security Agency, who was authorized to deny the request without giving any explanation to the applicant.[112]

49. MAP stated that the Israeli government did not allow Palestinian patients, even emergency cases or those requiring critical care, to enter East Jerusalem from the West Bank in a Palestinian registered ambulance. They must undergo a procedure known as the 'back-to-back' transfer at a checkpoint, whereby they are moved from a Palestinian

ambulance to an Israeli-registered one, leading to delays and causing medical risk for the patients.[99]

50. JS1 noted that Israel's separation wall and the Gaza blockade prevented Palestinian patients from accessing the six main specialist hospitals for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. The crisis in electricity and fuel supply in Gaza had led hospitals to cut most services. Ambulances and health professionals were also affected by access restrictions. The blockade on Gaza resulted in scarcity of essential medicines and equipment.[100]

51. MAP stated that during the 2014 offensive 16 hospitals and 51 primary health clinics were damaged and five clinics and Gaza's only rehabilitation hospital were completely destroyed.[101]

52. JS6 highlighted the situation of Gender Adjustment Treatments, and stated that sometimes the complementary treatments were not accessible to transgender people due to several regulatory failures in this domain.[102]

Right to education[103]

53. SAR noted that Israel established a multi-year, national plan for expanding access to higher education for the Arab, Druze and Circassian populations, addressing high student drop-out rates by providing pre-academic preparatory courses, social support, career transition advice and extension of institutions to outlying areas. SAR stated that minority students and staff remained underrepresented in education and commended the fact that the plan was re-budgeted in the Planning and Budgeting Committee.[104]

54. SAR highlighted that the law denying a Visa and Residency Permit for Advocates of Boycotting Israel, enacted in March 2017 impacted on scholars and students.[105]

55. JS6 noted that the education system in Israel did not include any mandatory educational or informative content regarding LGBTI people.[106]

56. JS5 noted that the educational sector in East Jerusalem was negatively impacted by a shortage of classrooms, a substandard quality of existing facilities and access restrictions for teachers and students. While Palestinian children in East Jerusalem are legally entitled to free public education, approximately 5,300 registered children were not able to enroll in school.[107] JS1 indicated that in comparison to schools residing to West Jerusalem, schools in East Jerusalem were receiving less funding.[108]

57. JS1 noted that the Israeli education system was discriminatory; forcibly integrating their curriculum and culture to the Palestinian official curriculum in East Jerusalem schools, with no respect for the religious and cultural rights of Palestinians.[109] JS5 stated that in 2015 the municipality started imposing Israeli curriculum on schools in East Jerusalem through restriction on funding; in 2016, the Minister of Education decided to "aid the process of Israelization" through extra-funding for schools using Israeli curriculum.[110] Al-Marsad noted that in the Occupied Syrian Golan, a new Israeli curriculum and school system also was imposed.[111]

58. APG23 reported that children from Tuba and Maghayir al-Abeed went to school escorted by an Israeli army patrol, protecting them from threats or attacks of the settlers.[112]

59. JS1 noted that children in the occupied Palestinian territory and particularly in East Jerusalem and Hebron were subject to closure, checkpoints which limit their access to education.[113]. JS1 stated that Israeli forces continued to demolish schools built in Area C.[114]

60. JS1 reported that Israeli forces were preventing the entry of construction materials to Gaza Strip to re-build and re-construct schools damaged during the conflict.[115] SAR stated that travel restrictions had particularly affected academic life in the Gaza Strip.[116] ODVV noted that in the Gaza War, over 200 schools, including three UN schools, were destroyed by Israel attacks. The reconstruction of these schools was hampered by the decade Gaza blockade.[117]

4. Rights of specific persons or groups

Women[118]

61. JS2 reported that in Jerusalem, if a woman is a victim of violence in the household, she will be reluctant to go to the Israeli authorities for fear of being forcibly transferred outside Jerusalem and losing the custody of the children.[119]

62. JS2 indicated that the restrictions in Gaza meant that women had no access to psychological support or safe spaces if they were victims of gender-based violence, and the decline in services was exacerbating the prevalence of gender-based violence, being the largest form of violence in Gaza strip.[120]

Children[121]

63. ECAPT noted that Israel had established a strong set of child-friendly laws and protection mechanisms against sexual exploitation and impressive prevention programmes on sexually transmitted diseases.[122]

64. ECPAT noted that children comprised approximately one third of Israel's total population, and that one group of children most at risk was children without legal status. Other children with vulnerability were children in street situations, children living in institutions, Bedouin, Palestinian and Arab Israeli children.[123]

65. DCIP reported that in 2016, West Bank children suffered the highest losses of the past decade at the hands of Israeli forces and security guards. It indicated that in just the first five months of 2017, nine Palestinian children had been killed by Israeli forces.[124]

66. MCW raised concerns from children detained in the West Bank in 2016, regarding issues such as night arrests, hand ties, blindfolds, physical abuse, strip searches, solitary confinement, and lack of parent accompaniment, access to lawyers, documentation in Hebrew, bail, education in prison, family visits among others.[125]

67. DCIP noted that Israel was the only country that systematically prosecutes between 500 and 700 children each year in military courts, lacking fundamental fair trial rights.[126] DCIP stated that in 2015, Israel renewed the practice of administrative detention of Palestinian children in the West Bank.[127]

68. DCIP stated that around 60 percent of Palestinian children ended up incarcerated in prisons inside Israel, and noted that Israel held increasing numbers of Palestinian children in solitary confinement.[128] Alkarama stated that holding children in detention centers in Israel violates the Fourth Geneva Convention.[129]

69. DCIP noted that children in East Jerusalem were generally subject to the Israeli Youth Law, implemented in a discriminatory manner.[130] DCIP noted that amendments to the Israeli penal code included stricter penalties for throwing a stone. It added that while the 20-year maximum sentencing existed prior to 2015, the word "stone" was added to target Palestinians.[131] GICJ and Alkarama raised similar concerns.[132]

70. DCIP noted that due to 10 years of military Gaza blockade, children continued to slip deeper into poverty, with many still living in protracted displacement.[133]

Persons with disabilities[134]

71. MAP welcomed Israel's ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. It was concerned that, despite Israel accepting recommendation 136.87[135] its occupation of Palestinian territory and its blockade and closure of Gaza continued to obstruct the rights of Palestinians with disabilities. Restrictions on the movement of Palestinians increased the barriers people with disabilities faced when trying to access their local community and the services they need.[136]

72. MAP noted that despite accepting recommendation 136.112[137] in the second UPR cycle, Israel failed to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure during its military offensives on Gaza in 2014, including taking all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk.[138]

Minorities and indigenous peoples[139]

73. JS4 stated that the new "Plan for Economic and Social Development among the Bedouin Community in the Negev 2017-2021" approved in February 2017, allocated large budgets to strengthen economic and social services among the Bedouin community, in the fields of education, employment, infrastructure, and strengthening Bedouin local councils. It observed that while this plan had some positive elements, it deliberately disregarded the 35 unrecognized Bedouin village and will only be implemented in the seven government-planned towns and the 11 recognized villages. According to JS4, it aimed at relocating citizens from unrecognized villages into government-planned towns and recognized villages.[140]

74. Adalah noted that the Memorandum of Law on the Regulation of Bedouin Settlement in the Negev, referred to as "Prawer II" continued to be dispossess and forcibly displace Bedouin citizens from the unrecognized villages.[141] Meezaan added that it denied Bedouin land claims, sought to concentrate the Bedouin in urban centers, and was expected to displace and relocate up to 70,000 Bedouin residents.[142]

75. JS4 noted that in most of the unrecognized villages there were no schools or health clinics. These villages lacked infrastructure, including electricity, running water, paved roads and sewage disposal systems.[143]

76. JS4 noted that regarding recommendation 136.84[144], no significant change was made in infant mortality gaps between Bedouin and Jewish residents of the Negev-Naqab.[145]

77. JS4 indicated that recommendation 136.100[146] was not met over the past five years, as by and large, the State of Israel had been mainly acting towards ending Bedouin possession over land in the Negev.[147] JS4 stated that Israel should recognize Bedouin land ownership rights instead of gradually dismissing all Bedouin land claims.[148]

78. JS4 noted that the house demolition policy, widely employed by the State against its Bedouin citizens, did not meet recommendation 136.98[149].[150] Meezaan stated that annual house demolitions in the Bedouin localities had increased, recently reaching an average of about 1,000 annual demolitions.[151]

79. Regarding recommendations 136.96 and 136.99[152], JS4 noted the ongoing inequality in planning in the Negev-Naqab, where126 settlements were established for the Jewish community, and only 18 were recognized Bedouin settlements.[153] Adalah indicated that Israel sought to use Bedouins' former lands to establish new Jewish communities, man-made forests, and other state infrastructures.[154]

Migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons[155]

80. AI noted that asylum-seekers in Israel continued to be denied access to a fair and prompt refugee status determination process. It mentioned that the Knesset had passed the fourth version of an amendment to the Prevention of Infiltration Law, allowing the authorities to detain asylum-seekers for up to one year without charge. AI also observed that the authorities continued to press thousands of Sudanese and Eritrean asylum-seekers to leave Israel "voluntarily".[156]

5. Specific regions or territories[157]

81. HRW noted that Israel continued to systematically expand its settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and to transfer Israeli citizens into the settlements in violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. By 2017, Israel had established 237 settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, housing approximately 580,000 settlers.[158] JS1 noted that Israel applied Israeli civil law to settlers, affording them legal protections and rights that were not extended to Palestinians living in the same territory subjected to Israeli military law.[159]

82. Badil reported on what it referred to as Israel's colonization of the OPT could be identified, such as demographic manipulation; de facto and de jure annexation; and domination over Palestinians through an illegally imposed discriminatory legal system.[160]

83. JS2 stated that Israel passed a law in the Knesset that retroactively legalizes settlement construction on privately owned Palestinian land, as well as legalizing settlement outposts, creating an obstacle to reaching a durable solution to the conflict.[161]

84. Alkarama noted the construction of new Israeli settlements in the OPT, despite the United Nations Security Council Resolution of 23 December 2016 demanding that Israel immediately and completely cease all settlement activities.[162] GICJ noted that in January 2017 alone, Israel approved the construction of 2,500 housing units in the occupied West Bank.[163] APG23 cited the plan to build 600 new houses in East Jerusalem.[164]

85. AI noted that in July 2014 Israel launched a 50-day military offensive in the Gaza Strip (*Operation Protective Edge*) that killed over 1,500 civilians, including 539 children, wounded thousands of civilians, and caused massive civilian displacement and destruction. Three years later, the Israeli authorities had indicted only three soldiers for looting and obstructing an investigation.[165]

86. Al-Haq noted that the 10th year of Israel's closure of the Gaza Strip had created a man-made humanitarian crisis, where 80 percent of Gazans were dependent on humanitarian aid.[166] Badil stated that Palestinians were denied access to natural resources such as natural gas, fishing waters and agricultural lands as well as living under an ongoing electricity crisis.[167]

87. HRW stated the Israeli navy, which patrols Gaza's Mediterranean coast, limited Palestinian fishing to a zone south of the Israel-Gaza border and north of the Egyptian border, up to six nautical miles (recently extended on a temporary basis to nine) west of the Gaza coast.[168]

88. Al-Marsad noted that there were at least 23,000 Israeli settlers in the Occupied Syrian Golan, living in 34 illegal settlements. The remaining native Syrian population of 25,000 lived in five villages located in the far north of the Occupied Syrian Golan. It added that the Israeli government approved plans for the construction of 1600 new settlement units in the Israeli settlement of Katzrin. It noted that discriminatory land and housing policies had meant that the remaining Syrian villages in the Occupied Syrian Golan were severely overcrowded.[169]

89. Al-Marsad noted that the majority of the native Syrian population continued to reject Israeli citizenship.[170]

Notes

[1] The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: www.ohchr.org. (One asterisk denotes a national human rights institution with "A" status)

Civil society

Individual submissions:

AccessNow	AccessNow (United States of America);
Adalah	Adalah- The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel (Israel);
Addamer	Addamer-Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association (Israel);
ADF International	ADF International (Switzerland);
AI	Amnesty International (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
Al-Haq	Al-Haq- Law in the Service of Man (Ramallah, Palestine);
Alkarama	Alkarama Foundation (Switzerland);
Al-Marsad	Al-Marsad- Arab Human Rights Centre in the Golan Heights (Occupied Syrian Golan);
APG23	Association "Comunita Papa Giovanni XXIII" (Italy);
Badil	Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights (Palestine);
DCIP	Defense for Children International-Palestine (Palestine/Israel);
EAFORD	International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of

	Racial Discrimination (Switzerland);
ECPAT	ECPAT International (Thailand);
FLD	Front Line Defenders (Ireland);
GICJ	Geneva International Centre for Justice (Switzerland);
HRA-NGO	Human Rights Alert NGO (Israel);
HRW	Human Rights Watch (Switzerland);
MAP	Medical Aid for Palestians (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);
MCW	Military Court Watch (Ramallah, Palestine);
Meezaan	Meezaan Center for Human Rights Nazareth (Israel);
ODVV	Organization for Defending Victims of Violence (Iran);
PHRI	Physicians for Human Rights-Israel (Israel);
SAR	Scholars at Risk Network (United States of America).
Joint submissions	
JS1	**Joint submission 1 submitted by**: Al Marsad-Social, Economic Policies Monitor (Lebanon);
JS2	**Joint submission 2 submitted by**: Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC), Community Action Center (CAC) - Al-Quds University, and The Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms (MADA), with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) (Switzerland);
JS3	**Joint submission 3 submitted by**: Human Rights Defenders Fund; Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel; Al Tufula Pedagogical & Multipurpose Women's Center; Coalition of Women for Peace; The Association Women Against Violence (Israel);
JS4	**Joint submission 4 submitted by**: Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality; Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages; Alhuquq Center; Sidreh - Lakiya Negev Weaving (Israel);
JS5	**Joint submission 5 submitted by**: Coalition of 17 organisations Adalah Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association Al-Haq Arab Thought Forum Arab Studies Society, Maps and GIS Department Defence for Children International – Palestine Section Early Childhood Resource Center General Federation of Workers Trade Unions of Palestine Jerusalem Society for Welfare and Development Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center Jerusalem Center for Democracy and Human Rights Land Research Center The Grassroots Palestinian Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign The Jerusalem Arab Chamber of Commerce and Industry The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, MIFTAH The Palestinian Counselling Center The Society of Saint Yves The Palestinian Union of Social Workers Union of Health Work Committees Vocational Training Center Welfare Association Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counselling Women's Studies Center Yabous Cultural Center (Jerusalem Palestine);
JS6	**Joint submission 6 submitted by**: 'Hoshen' – Education and Change; 'Ha-Aguda' – the National Association of LGBT in Israel; 'Havruta' – Religious Gays; 'Ma'avarim' – Israeli Transgender Community; 'Tehila' – Support for Parents and Families of LGTB; the LGBT House in Be'er Sheva and The Association of Israeli Gay Fathers (Israel);
JS7	**Joint submission 7 submitted by**: Community Action Center (Al-Quds University); Al-Haq; Society of St. Yves - Catholic Center for Human Rights (St. Yves); the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies CIHRS (Jerusalem Palestine);
JS8	**Joint submission 8 submitted by**: CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations Network; Arab NGO Network for Development

(South Africa).

[2] The following abbreviations are used in UPR documents:

ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
OP-ICESCR	Optional Protocol to ICESCR;
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
ICCPR-OP 1	Optional Protocol to ICCPR;
ICCPR-OP 2	Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty;
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women;
OP-CEDAW	Optional Protocol to CEDAW;
CAT	Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;
OP-CAT	Optional Protocol to CAT;
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child;
OP-CRC-AC	Optional Protocol to CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict;
OP-CRC-SC	Optional Protocol to CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography;
OP-CRC-IC	Optional Protocol to CRC on a communications procedure;
ICRMW	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families;
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;
OP-CRPD	Optional Protocol to CRPD;
ICPPED	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

[3] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras 136.1-136.12, 136.14-136.16, 136.29-136.46, 136.50-136.52, 136.160, 136.188, 136.195-136.199, 136.201, 136.236-136.237.

[4] Alkarama, p.3.

[5] JS8, p.15. See also JS5, p.11; JS1, p.2.

[6] JS1, p.1.

[7] JS5, p.11. See also CIGC, p.1.

[8] GIGC, p.1. See also JS5, p.11; AI, p.5.

[9] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras.136.13; 136.25-136.26; 136.28; 136.47-136.49; 136.78; 136.108; 136.111; 136.135; 136.152-136.154; 136.157-136.158; 136.161; 136.163-136.164; 136.166-136.188; 136.170-136.175; 136.177; 136.179-136.180; 136.182-136.187; 136.189-136.193; 136.200; 138.202-136.204; 136.206-136.207; 136.218-136.219; 136.221-136.225; 137.5-137.7.

[10] JS1, p.2.

[11] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.17-136.18; 136.20-136.21; 136.27; 136.53-136.55; 136.57-136.59; 136.61-136.63; 136.107; 136.110; 136.146; 136.203; 137.2.

[12] EAFORD, p.1.

[13] JS1, p.2.

[14] Meezaan, p.1. See also Adalah, p.2-3.

[15] A/HRC/25/15 recommendations 136.58 (Canada); 136.90 (Cyprus) and 136.95 (Norway).

[16] Adalah, p.2-3.

[17] GICG, p.2.

[18] EAFORD, p.6.

[19] JS6, p.14.

[20] For relevant recommendation see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.234.

[21] EAFORD, p.3-4.

[22] EAFORD, p.4.

[23] JS3, pp.2-3. See also Adalah, p.3; Meezaan, p.6.

[24] JS3, p.2-3. See also AI, p.8; Meezaan, p.7.

[25] Adalah, p.3.

[26] Meezaan, p.6.

[27] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.22, 136.113, 136.115-136.125, 136.129-136.133.

[28] AI, p.6-7. See also Badil, p.6; EAFORD, p.2.

[29] JS7, p.6. See also GICJ, p3.
[30] EAFORD, p.2.
[31] HRW, p. 1-2.
[32] JS8, p. 10-11. See also JS2, p. 4.
[33] JS3, p. 5.
[34] Meezaan, p. 4.
[35] Alkarama, p. 3. See also JS2, p. 3, PHRI, p. 4-5.
[36] AI, p. 2-3.
[37] Addameer, p. 3-4. See also Adalah, p. 6, GICJ, p. 4.
[38] PHRI, p. 4. See also ODVV, p.3, Alkarama, p. 5-6.
[39] Alkarama, p. 5-6.
[40] AI, p. 2. See also Alkarama, p. 6-7. GICJ, p.4, Adalah, p. 5, JS8, p. 5-6.
[41] Addameer, (p. 2) See also HRW, p. 5-6, GICJ, p. 4.
[42] FLD, p. 3.
[43] JS3, p. 5.
[44] JS8, p. 9.
[45] GICJ, p. 4. See also Adalah, p. 5.
[46] Addameer, p.1.
[47] Addameer, p4.
[48] Adalah, p. 5. See also PHRI, p. 6-7, JS8, p. 10-11, Alkarama, p. 5-6.
[49] PHRI, p. 6-7. See also Addamer, p. 4, ODVV, p. 3.
[50] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.65-136.66, 136.208-136.210.
[51] Addameer, p. 2.
[52] HRA-NGO, p. 2-9.
[53] AI, p. 1. See also. HRW, p. 1.
[54] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.67-136.77; 136.79-136.80; 136.109; 136.142-136.144; 136.148-136.151; 136.162; 136.169; 136.211-136.217; 136.176; 136.178; 136.181; 137.1; 137.3.
[55] JS5, p. 7-8. See also EAFORD, p. 5.
[56] ODVV, p. 5.
[57] ADF International, p. 1-2.
[58] JS8, p. 7.
[59] AI, p. 3-4. See also JS8, p. 4; FLD, p. 4; GICJ, p. 3-4; ODVV, p. 5.
[60] JS3, p. 6.
[61] JS2, p. 8. See also GICJ, p. 3-4.
[62] FLD, p. 3. See also GICJ, p. 3-4; ODVV, p. 5.
[63] JS8, p. 4. See also FLD, p. 4.
[64] JS3, p.7-8.
[65] JS3, p. 3.
[66] JS8, p. 4.
[67] Alkarama, p. 8.
[68] HRW, p. 2.
[69] FLD, p. 1.
[70] JS3, p.5. See also EAFORD, p.5.
[71] Adalah, p. 2.
[72] HRW, p. 4-5. See also JS5, p. 8-9; JS2, p. 4; AI, p. 4.
[73] AI, p. 4.
[74] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.23-136.24; 136.56.
[75] AccessNow, p. 1-3.
[76] ADF International, p. 3.
[77] JS7, p. 4-5. See also EAFORD, p. 6; JS2, p. 7.
[78] JS6, p. 11-12.
[79] JS6, p. 4-7.
[80] For relevant recommendation see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.82.
[81] EAFORD, p. 5.
[82] JS1, p. 4-5.
[83] JS7, p. 6.
[84] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras 136.145; 136.165; 136.226-136.229; 136.235.
[85] EAFORD, p. 5. See also ODVV, p. 2.
[86] Adalah, p. 3.
[87] Meezaan, p. 1.
[88] JS5, p. 1-2. See also JS5, p. 5; 8-9; JS7, p. 2; Al-Haq, p. 4; EAFORD, p. 5.

[97] Al-Haq, p. 2. See also JS7, p. 2; JS2, p. 3.
[98] AI, p. 7. See also HRW (p. 3-4).
[99] JS, p. 5.
[100] Alkarama, p. 5.
[101] JS5, p. 6. See also Al-Haq (p 3); AI, p. 7.
[102] HRW, p. 3-4. See also GIC, p. 2.
[103] JS2, p. 3.
[104] JS7, p. 6. See also JS5, p. 4.
[105] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.83-136.84.
[106] PHRI, p. 1.
[107] MAP, p.2.
[108] JS1, p. 6. See also ODVV, p. 2; PHRI, p. 2.
[109] MAP, p. 3.
[110] JS6, p.8-11.
[111] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.85-136.86.
[112] SAR, p. 3.
[113] SAR, p. 4.
[114] JS6, p. 15.
[115] JS5, p. 2-3.
[116] JS1, p. 7.
[117] JS1, p. 7.
[118] JS5, p. 2-3.
[119] Al-Marsad, p. 4.
[120] APG23, p. 4.
[121] JS1, p. 7. See also SAR, p. 5.
[122] JS1, p. 7. See also EAFORD, p. 5.
[123] JS1, p. 7.
[124] SAR, p. 5.
[125] ODVV, p. 5.
[126] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.19; 136.60; 136.64; 136.81.
[127] JS2, p. 7.
[128] *JS2, p. 4.*
[129] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.112; 136.114; 136.126-136.128; 134.134; 136.136-136.141; 136.159; 136.194; 137.4.
[130] ECPAT, p. 3-4.
[131] ECPAT, p. 2.
[132] DCIP, p. 1-4.
[133] MCV, p. 2-5. See also HRW, p. 6; Alkarama, p. 7-8.
[134] DCIP, p. 2.
[135] DCIP, p. 3. See also, HRW, p. 6.
[136] DCPI, p. 2-3. See also MCW, p. 1.
[137] Alkarama, p. 7-8. See also CIGC, p. 4.
[138] DCIP, p. 4.
[139] DCIP, p. 5. See also HRW, p. 6; Alkarama, p. 7-8.
[140] GIC, p. 4; Alkarama, p. 3.
[141] DCIP, p. 1.
[142] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.87-136.89.
[143] A/HRC/25/15 recommendation 136.87 (Canada).
[144] MAP, p. 4-5.
[145] A/HRC/25/15 recommendation 136.112 (Norway).
[146] MAP, p. 5.
[147] For relevant recommendations see A/HRC/25/15, paras. 136.90-136.103.
[148] JS4, p. 5-6. See also Mezzaan, p. 2; Adalah, p. 4-5; AI, p. 7; EAFORD, p. 4; ODVV, p. 2.
[149] Adalah, p. 4-5.
[150] Mezzaan, p. 3.
[151] JS4, p. 3-4.
[152] A/HRC/25/15 recommendation 136.84 (Belgium).
[153] JS4, p. 12.
[154] A/HRC/25/15 recommendation 136.103 (Belgium).
[155] JS4, p. 6.
[156] JS4, p. 6-7.
[157] A/HRC/25/15 recommendation 136.98 (Australia).

[1] JS4, p 8.
[2] Mezvrano, p. 2. See also Al-Haq, p 3; HRW, p. 4.
[3] A/HRC/29/19 recommendation(s) 136.96 (France); 136.99 (Czech Republic).
[4] JS4, p. 10-11.
[5] Adalah, p. 4-5.
[6] For relevant recommendation(s) see A/HRC/29/19, paras. 136.104-136.106, 136.147, 136.155-136.156, 136.231-136.233.
[7] Al, p. 7.
[8] For relevant recommendation(s) see A/HRC/29/19, paras 136.107-136.108, 136.151-136.154 136.164-136.168-136.170, 136.173-136.174, 136.176-136.178, 136.180, 136.187, 136.203, 136.214-136.217, 136.230, 137.9, 137.7.
[9] HRW, p. 1. See also GI-ER 1, p. 1; Addameer, p. 1.
[10] JS5, p. 1. See also JS7, p. 2; Badil, p. 2; MIFW, p. 5; JS2, p. 9.
[11] Badil, p. 1-6.
[12] JS2, p. 6. See also HRW, p. 3; GIEVV, p. 4; ITJ, p. 2.
[13] Shezawiya, p. 5.
[14] GI-3, p. 7.
[15] AI9-23, p. 2.
[16] Al, p. 6. See also Badil, p. 3; Al-Haq, p. 5; Shezawiya p. 4; Shezawiya, p. 4; HRW, p. 1; GIEVV, p. 3; GIEVV, p. 1.
[17] Al-Haq, p. 5. See also GI-ER 1, p. 1.
[18] Badil, p. 1. See also GI-3, p. 1; ILO 0003, p. 2-4.
[19] HRW, p. 4.
[20] Al-Marsad, p. 1-2.
[21] Al-Marsad, p. 4.